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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the Order of the Utah 
Supreme Court dated September 4, 1998, and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellee The Travelers Indemnity Company ("Travelers") submits the following 
statement of the issues on appeal and standards of appellate review, as it disagrees with the 
issues framed by the appellant Carla Cannon ("Cannon"). Travelers submits that the issues 
are as follows: 
1. Whether Cannon, who is neither a named insured nor an insured under the 
Travelers policy issued to Scott and Jesselie Anderson, is owed the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing when she had no contractual privity or contractual relationship with Travelers? 
2. Whether Cannon, who is neither a named insured nor an insured, under a 
homeowner's policy to which she is not a party, should be entitled to the same duty of good 
faith and fair dealing as those who are parties by the contract? 
3. Whether Travelers should be held liable for alleged breach of a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing to a stranger to the insurance policy if such a cause of action is now extended 
to persons having no contractual privity and no contractual relationship even though such a 
claim has not previously been recognized in Utah and existing Utah law has required 
contractual privity? 
4. Whether Cannon, a claimant without contractual privity or a contractual 
relationship with Travelers, should be entitled to assert a claim for breach of a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing where her claim for medical payments was fairly debatable? 
5. Whether Utah's unfair claim settlement practices statutes and rules which are 
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regulatory in nature should create a private cause of action despite express provisions stating 
that no private cause of action is created? 
6. Whether broad consequential damages should be available for breach of express 
terms of an insurance policy, as opposed to the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, contrary to the law set forth in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 
(Utah 1996)? 
The applicable standard of appellate review on all of these issues is correction of 
error. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no determinative statutes or regulations in this appeal. The issues in this 
appeal are governed by Utah case law and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case. 
This action involves Cannon's claim for alleged breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in an insurance policy, i.e., an insurance "bad faith" claim. The 
insurance at issue is a homeowner's policy issued by Travelers to Scott and Jesselie 
Anderson. Cannon was not a party to the insurance contract. Cannon's claim arises out of 
an incident while she was visiting the Anderson home and the Andersons' ten year old 
daughter (Cannon's niece) ran to greet her. Cannon claims that she injured her back when 
her niece jumped up and threw her arms around her in greeting her. Although allegedly 
feeling immediate pain and continuing to suffer from the back pain for months, Cannon did 
not complain to the Andersons at the time of the incident, did not say that she was in any 
pain, and withheld any information concerning the alleged injury or her pain until almost 
- 2 -
four months later even though she continued to see and socialize with the Andersons. When 
Cannon told the Andersons, nearly four months following the alleged incident, that she had 
been injured on their premises when their daughter greeted her, the Andersons questioned 
whether Cannon's injury was actually related to the greeting incident. 
Travelers first notification of the alleged claim was on January 5,1993, four and a half 
months after the incident. Investigation of the incident revealed that Cannon had not 
mentioned anything to the Andersons until three and a half months had elapsed. The 
Andersons were completely unaware of any problem and Jesselie Anderson did not notice 
anything amiss at the time of the incident, even though she was present when her daughter 
greeted Cannon. Travelers' claims adjuster advised Cannon that he questioned how her 
injury could be related to the incident at the Anderson home. Cannon subsequently provided 
a letter from her physician indicating that in his opinion the injury that Cannon sustained in 
August 1992 could have subsequently led to her herniated disc and the surgery performed. 
There was no further evidence provided that Cannon's herniated disc and surgery in 
December 1992 were causally connected to the greeting incident. 
After attempting to work through uncertainties about the claim, Travelers and Cannon 
were unable to come to a resolution. Cannon subsequently instituted this lawsuit against 
Travelers making a claim for medical expenses under the medical payment coverage 
provision of the Andersons' policy and further making a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After initial discovery, Cannon submitted a 
settlement demand to Travelers. Cannon submitted affidavits from her parents and sister 
with the settlement demand, which, for the first time, provided Travelers with evidence that 
Cannon had complained of back pain immediately following the incident. The affidavits 
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explained that Cannon complained about her back pain to her parents the evening of the 
incident and further explained that Cannon and her parents discussed that it would be better 
not to mention anything to the Andersons because the Andersons were important witnesses 
in litigation involving the estate of Cannon's deceased sister. Cannon therefore withheld any 
information concerning her alleged injury from the Andersons until she underwent surgery 
some three and one-half months following the incident. After receiving the affidavits in 
conjunction with the settlement demand, Travelers paid the full $10,000 limits of its medical 
payments coverage to Cannon. 
Course Of Proceedings And Disposition At Trial Court. 
Travelers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Cannon's remaining claims on 
July 14,1997. Travelers' motion was based upon the grounds that there was no further claim 
for breach of the express contract terms afterpayment of the medical expenses, that there was 
no claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing since Cannon had 
no contractual privity with Travelers, and that the validity of Cannon's claim was fairly 
debatable. (R. 115-199) A hearing on the motion was held on November 10,1997. The court 
ruled that the first and third causes of action of plaintiff s first amended complaint would be 
dismissed on the ground that Cannon lacked contractual privity with Travelers and was not 
defined as an insured in the policy, and that a right to sue for medical benefits, without 
contractual privity, did not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists 
between parties to the contract. The court further dismissed the fourth cause of action ruling 
that alleged violations of the Utah Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Statutes and Rules do 
not give rise to any private cause of action. On Cannon's second cause of action, for breach 
of the express policy terms, the court ruled that the broad consequential damages sought were 
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not available for breach of the express terms, but denied the motion to the extent that Cannon 
sought attorney's fees and litigation expenses incurred in pursuing her claim for 
reimbursement of medical expenses, and further sought interest on the medical expenses up 
to the point when they were paid. 
The court's order granting partial summary judgment and denying the motion in part, 
was entered on December 10, 1997. (R.l 146 and Addendum 1.) The parties subsequently 
settled the remaining part of the second cause of action, which settlement included the 
payment of Cannon's claim for costs, attorney's fees and interest in connection with the 
claim to recover the medical benefits. The parties therefore stipulated to an Order of 
Dismissal with prejudice on this remaining claim, and an Order of Dismissal was entered by 
the court on April 30, 1998. (R.l 151-1154 and Addendum 2 and 3). 
Statement Of Facts. 
Travelers initially notes that Cannon's statement of facts misstates the record in many 
particulars and further sets forth much by way of argument. Travelers submits that the 
argumentative, conclusory fashion of Cannon's statement of facts is improper and should be 
left for the argument. Importantly, Cannon's statement of facts, whether misstated or based 
on argument, are immaterial to the issues presented here, which are issues of law. 
Travelers further notes that Cannon's statement of facts references the affidavits of 
Gary Fye, submitted by Cannon as an insurance claims expert. Travelers submits that the 
references to Gary Fye's affidavit consist of unsupported opinions, legal conclusions and 
argument. Travelers made a motion with the trial court to strike the affidavit of Gary Fye as 
it did not comply with Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as the affidavit was 
replete with conclusory, argumentative statements and there were few, if any, admissible 
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facts set forth in the affidavit. While the trial court did not rule upon the motion to strike, it 
is obvious that the court did not accept the statements in the affidavit. Travelers submits that 
the affidavit should not be considered on appeal for the same reasons that it should not have 
been considered below and hereby incorporates its motion to strike affidavit testimony and 
supporting memoranda. (R.1030-1040, 1125-1133.) In addition to all of the grounds for 
inadmissibility, the statements and arguments are immaterial as this appeal presents issues 
of law for determination by the court. 
Travelers submits the following statement of facts as facts that are material to the 
issues on appeal: 
1. On August 16, 1992, Cannon was visiting at the home of Scott and Jesselie 
Anderson. Scott Anderson is Cannon's first cousin and Cannon has also known Jesselie 
Anderson since 1963. (R. 1167 at pp.11,12.) 
2. While at the Anderson home, Cannon bent over to hug the Andersons' ten year old 
daughter Heidi, who had run up to greet her. (R. 1167 at p.24.) 
3. Cannon alleges that she felt immediate pain when she bent over and Heidi threw 
her arms around her, but she did not tell anyone that she was hurt or suffered pain. (R. 1167 
at pp. 32, 33.) 
4. Between the date of the incident, August 16, 1992, and Thanksgiving 1992, 
Cannon did not seek any medical attention for her alleged back injury. (R. 1167 at p. 51.) 
5. Cannon did not say anything to the Andersons about the incident or her alleged 
injury until December 3, 1992, despite having talked to Jesselie Anderson on several 
occasions. (R. 1167 at pp. 47, 48.) 
6. At the time of the incident, the Andersons had a policy of homeowner's insurance 
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with Travelers. This policy provided liability coverage for the Andersons, which included 
a medical payments provision. The pertinent part of Travelers policy is contained in 
Coverage F-Medical Payments to Others. This coverage is part of the Liability Coverages 
provided to the Andersons under Section II of the policy. (See policy at R.151-185, and 
Liability Coverages including medical payments to others provision at R. 166, and Appellee's 
Addendum 4, p.26.) 
7. Travelers received its first notice of Cannon's claim involving the August 1992 
incident on January 5, 1993. The claim letter submitted by Cannon to Travelers is dated 
December 21, 1992, but the claim was not received by Travelers until January 5, 1993. 
(R.l 166 at pp. 4, 7, 58.) 
8. Tom Day, the claims adjuster for Travelers discussed the claim with Cannon and 
with the Andersons. The Andersons told Mr. Day that they did not know anything about 
Cannon's claim until December 1992, and that they thought Cannon may have injured her 
back in a sporting event or by trying to lift her invalid father. (R.l 167 at p.85; R.l 166 at 
pp.88-90, 127.) 
9. Unbeknownst to either Travelers or the Andersons, Cannon intentionally withheld 
information concerning her injury from the Andersons for several months because Cannon's 
family needed the Andersons as supportive witnesses in litigation involving the estate of 
Cannon's deceased sister. (R.l 167 at pp. 41-47.) 
10. When Travelers' claims adjuster asked Cannon for proof that her herniated disc 
and back surgery were causally related to the incident at the Anderson home, Cannon 
provided a letter from her treating physician, stating that the injury sustained by Cannon in 
August 1992 could have subsequently led to the disc rupture and surgical intervention. 
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(R.189.) There was no other medical evidence drawing a causal connection between the 
incident and Cannon's medical condition. 
11. After initiating this lawsuit in October 1994, Cannon's counsel submitted a 
settlement proposal to Travelers by letter of June 9,1995. This settlement proposal included 
affidavits from Cannon's parents, Elaine Cannon and D. James Cannon, and from Cannon's 
sister, Susan C. McOmber. These affidavits, for the first time, explained to Travelers why 
Cannon had not complained to the Andersons for several months, and further provided 
evidence that Cannon had told her parents about the incident and had complained of back 
pain the evening of the incident. (See affidavits of Elaine Cannon, D. James Cannon, and 
Susan C. McOmber, R.190, 194, 197, respectively.) 
12. The affidavit of Elaine Cannon, provided to Travelers in June of 1995, stated that 
her daughter told her about the incident the afternoon of August 16, 1992 and that Cannon 
described having felt immediate back pain. The affidavit further stated that: 
However, we discussed that it would be better not to mention anything to the 
Andersons. Scott and Jesselie Anderson were important witnesses with our 
family in litigation involving the estate of our deceased daughter. It was 
important that nothing be done to offend or alienate the Andersons. I therefore 
strongly suggested to Carla that she not address this matter with the 
Andersons. Hopefully, her back injury would improve without the need of any 
medical treatment and we would never need to involve the Andersons. 
(R.191.) The affidavit goes on to explain that Cannon continued to have back problems 
during the ensuing months until she sought medical attention and had surgery. 
13. The affidavit of Susan C. McOmber indicated that on August 21 or 22, 1992, 
Cannon had confided in her that she had injured her back while visiting the Anderson home, 
but that she did not report the incident to the Andersons because they were witnesses in a 
lawsuit brought against the Cannon family by Cannon's deceased sister's husband. (R. 197-
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8.) 
14. After receiving and considering the affidavits submitted by Cannon in June 1995, 
Travelers paid the limits of its medical payments coverage to Cannon. Payment was 
tendered by letter dated July 18, 1995 (R.123.) 
15. Cannon is not a named insured under the Travelers insurance policy and further 
does not qualify as an "insured" as defined in the policy. The term "insured" is defined to 
mean the named insured [Scott and Jesselie Anderson] and residents of the named insured's 
household, as well as other specified persons with respect to responsibility for animals, 
watercraft, or the use of vehicles. (See policy R. 153,154; R. 1166 at Ex. 2, Addendum 4, pp. 
1,2.) 
Response To Cannon's Asserted Statement Of Facts 
As noted above, many of Cannon's asserted facts misstate the record, contain 
argument, and refer to inadmissible evidence. Moreover, many of the assertions are 
immaterial to the legal issues in this appeal. Travelers nevertheless responds to Cannon's 
statement of facts, by paragraph, as follows: 
1. Paragraph 1 misstates the record. The record reflects that Heidi was ten years old 
at the time. (R.l 166, Ex.1, p.7.) 
5. Paragraph 5 misstates the record. Jesselie Anderson advised Cannon that she had 
called her father, who is an insurance agent, and Anderson's father said that Travelers would 
deny the claim. For that reason, Anderson told Cannon that she was not going to submit a 
claim to Travelers. (R.l 167 at pp.63-64.) 
7. Paragraph 7 misstates the record. The claim letter submitted by Cannon to 
Travelers is dated December 21, 1992, but the claim was not received by Travelers until 
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January 5, 1993. (R.1166 at Ex.1, pp.4, 7.) 
9. Paragraph 9 consists of argument, not fact. Contrary to Cannon's argument, Mr. 
Day did not refuse to accept further information concerning the incident or to interview 
witnesses. Mr. Day interviewed Jesselie Anderson and she advised him that she knew 
nothing of Cannon's claimed injury until December 1992, and that she thought Cannon may 
have injured her back in a sporting event or by trying to lift her invalid father. (R. 1167 at 
p.85; R.1166 at pp. 88-90.) 
10. Contrary to Cannon's statement of fact in paragraph 10, Travelers did not refuse 
to obtain medical records. Mr. Day obtained records from Dr. Hecht. (R. 1166 at pp.98,99.) 
Travelers further obtained a statement from Dr. J. Lynn Smith. Dr. Smith did not causally 
relate Cannon's back surgery to the August 16,1992 incident, but stated only that the injury 
could have subsequently led to the disc rupture and surgery. (R.189.) 
11. Contrary to Cannon's statement in paragraph 11, Cannon did not urge Mr. Day 
to call her parents to confirm the injury. Cannon testified that Mr. Day asked her who knew 
about the injury, and she told him several people and probably mentioned the names of her 
parents. (R.l 167 at pp.81-83.) Day used the phrase "medical certainty" rather than "more 
likely than not." However, Dr. Smith's indication that the injury "could have" been related 
to the August 1992 incident does not meet either standard. 
12. Paragraph 12 misstates the record. Cannon did not continue to urge Day to 
contact health care providers. Mr. Day obtained records from Dr. Hecht and a letter from Dr. 
J. Lynn Smith. (R.l 166 at pp.95-97.) Day did not receive sufficient medical evidence that 
Cannon's claim was causally related to the incident on the Andersons' premises. Whether 
Day used the phrase "medical certainty", "probability" or "more likely than not" is 
- 1 0 -
immaterial since the medical evidence indicated only a possibility. (R. 1166 at pp. 130,131.) 
13. Paragraph 13 is based upon Fye's affidavit testimony. This testimony is 
inadmissible and should not be considered. (See Travelers Motion to Strike Affidavit 
Testimony, R.1030-1040; 1125-1133.) 
14. Travelers' settlement offer to Cannon was made simply in an effort to resolve and 
conclude the claim, despite the fact that there was insufficient medical proof to show that 
Cannon's injury occurred on Travelers' insureds' premises. (R.l 166 at pp. 94, 95.) 
15. Travelers' payment of $352.20 was an effort to pay out-of-pocket medical 
expenses at the time. Mr. Day was simply unable to duplicate the calculation at the time of 
his deposition. (R. 1166 at pp. 103-108.) 
16. Travelers made a settlement proposal to Cannon in an effort to resolve and close 
the file on June 14, 1993. This settlement offer was rejected by Cannon. (R.l 166 at pp.94, 
95.) 
17. Paragraph 17 is argumentative. Travelers did not refuse to communicate further, 
but had not received sufficient evidence to substantiate Cannon's claim and no further 
evidence was provided until after the filing of the complaint when affidavits of Cannon's 
parents were produced in June, 1995. (R.l90-199.) 
18. After receiving the letter from Cannon's attorney, Travelers re-opened the claim 
file. It was not noted by Mr. Day's supervisor that the prior investigation had been 
incomplete. Rather, there is simply a notation in the file, following the receipt of the 
attorney's letter, that more investigation is needed. (R.l 166 at Exh. 1, pp. 4, 6.) 
20. Paragraph 20 and each of its subparagraphs contain argument, rather than facts. 
As was set forth in Travelers motion to strike affidavit testimony, these arguments and 
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conclusory statements by Fye should have been stricken and should not be considered here 
on appeal. The arguments are immaterial to the legal issues involved in this appeal. Fye's 
testimony assumes the existence of a legal duty, which is a legal issue for the court. 
21. Paragraph 21 also consists of argument. It is not a factual statement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, a bad faith claim is derived from the insurance contract in both first-
party and third-party situations. The implied covenant runs only to the benefit of those who 
were parties to the contract. Cannon was not a party to the insurance contract and does not 
qualify as an insured under the policy. Instead, Cannon is a claimant making a claim for 
medical expenses under the medical payment provision of the policy, which is part of the 
liability coverages provided to the insureds under the policy. There is nothing under the 
medical payments provision granting a right to a claimant to sue Travelers. Cannon's 
assertion that she is a "first-party insured" is contrary to the policy language and is simply 
an attempt to create a contractual relationship with Travelers where none exists. 
Cannon argues that the several Utah cases that have outlined the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing have not sufficiently outlined the law to govern this matter. Cannon 
essentially urges the court to look to the law of other states and ignore well-defined Utah law. 
Utah courts have held strictly to the rule that in order to maintain an insurance bad faith 
claim, the parties must be in privity of contract. Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that such a claim may be brought only by a party to the insurance contract. In Savage 
v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), the court rejected a bad faith claim despite 
the appearance of a contractual relationship and a right to sue on the part of the claimant. 
Like Savage, Travelers would have an unresolvable conflict if it were deemed to owe 
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Cannon a contractual duty of good faith and its insured a contractual duty of good faith. The 
two parties have diametrically opposed interests. 
Cannon is not a third-party beneficiary to the medical payments provision, but is 
rather an incidental beneficiary. The primary purpose of the provision is to benefit the 
Andersons, as the insureds. There is no expression of an intent to provide injured claimants 
with a right to sue Travelers for the medical benefits. However, even if Cannon is deemed 
an intended third-party beneficiary, the intended benefit is only to the extent of the medical 
payments. There is no expression of an intent by the contracting parties to confer the greater 
benefit of the implied covenants that flow only between the parties to the contract. 
The unfair claims settlement practices statute and rule do not create any private cause 
of action. Utah case law establishes when the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
arises. Cannon's reliance upon industry standards and expert testimony is misplaced. 
The claim submitted by Cannon was fairly debatable. Cannon claimed that she 
seriously injured her back while greeting Andersons' ten year old daughter. No one present 
noticed anything amiss, nothing was said, and Cannon intentionally withheld any information 
about her claim until she needed surgery for her back condition. The causal connection 
between the greeting incident and Cannon's serious back injury was certainly questionable. 
Under these circumstances, there were factual issues as to the claim's validity, legitimizing 
denial of the claim. Under Utah law, where there is a debatable reason for denial, the claim 
is fairly debatable as a matter of law, eliminating the bad faith claim. 
The established Utah law has recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in only two situations, both of which involve the insurer's own insured. The duty has 
not been extended to third-party beneficiaries. If the duty is now extended to persons in 
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Cannon's position, Travelers should not be held to have breached a newly recognized duty. 
Travelers has paid the limits of the medical payments coverage, incurred costs, 
attorney's fees, and interest, and should therefore have no further damage exposure for 
alleged breach of the express terms of the contract. 
If a cause of action for insurance bad faith is extended to any medical payment 
claimant who is not a party to the insurance contract, the class of potential bad faith plaintiffs 
becomes limitless. This type of coverage is not mandatory and is simply an additional benefit 
provided to insured homeowners. If insurers become exposed to an endless array of bad faith 
claims arising out of the medical payments coverage, insurers would be better off not to offer 
the coverage. These claims are not in the interest of the public, and there is no reason to 
extend the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to med-pay claimants. The benefits 
available to such claimants should be limited to the medical expenses themselves. The 
availability of a bad faith claim should be limited to the parties to the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The district court entered summary judgment dismissing Cannon's claim for alleged 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after reviewing lengthy 
memoranda filed by both parties. This court reviews the district court's order under the same 
standard employed by the district court under Utah R.Civ.P. 56. Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 
P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). Summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Although this court reviews the district court decision for correction of error without 
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, under standards of appellate 
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review, this court should affirm the district court if its decision is sustainable on any proper 
ground. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm the trial court if we can do so 
on any proper ground even if the court below assigned an incorrect reason for 
its ruling. 
Allphin Realty. Inc. v. Sine. 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979). See also Buehner Block Co. 
v.UWC Assoc. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988). This rule of appellate review applies even if the 
proper ground was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and even if the proper 
ground is not urged on appeal. Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Reg.. 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 
(Utah 1974). 
II. RULES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION. 
The policy language at issue is clear and unambiguous and should therefore be 
interpreted as a matter of law. Insurance policies are merely contracts and should be 
interpreted under the same rules governing ordinary contracts. Village Inn Apts. v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law and if a contract is determined to be unambiguous its 
interpretation is also a question of law. Id. A policy term is not ambiguous merely because 
one party assigns a different meaning to it in accordance with his or her own interest. Id. at 
583. The terms of insurance contracts should be interpreted in accordance with their usually 
accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, with an attempt to harmonize and give 
effect to all of the contract provisions. Nielsen v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992). 
The general rule of interpretation favors the insured when the policy contains 
ambiguous provisions. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). 
One acknowledged rationale for this rule is the need to afford the protection that the insured 
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endeavored to secure by paying premiums. LPS Hospital v Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 
857, 858 (Utah 1988). This general rule of interpretation, however, operates only after the 
insured has been determined. "It does not operate in deciding whether a certain entity 
belongs to the insured class described in the policy. Accordingly, a third person who is not 
a party to a contract of insurance usually is not entitled to a construction in his favor in 
determining whether that third person is an insured." Atlas Assurance Co. v. General 
Builders. 600 P.2d 850, 853 (N.M. App. 1979). See also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
Aztec Plumbing Corp.. 796 P.2d 227, 229 (Nev. 1990) ("the rule that ambiguities in an 
insurance contract are liberally construed in favor of the insured does not apply in deciding 
who is an insured.") 
III. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING UNDER UTAH LAW IS 
DEPENDENT UPON CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY OR A DIRECT CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIP. 
Cannon was not a party to the insurance contract and lacks the requisite contractual 
privity or direct contractual relationship necessary to make a claim under Utah law for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Cannon attempts to characterize 
herself as an "unnamed insured" and a first-party insured in order to create a contractual 
relationship. Cannon is neither a named insured nor an unnamed insured under the policy. 
Cannon's attempt to categorize her status as a first-party insured as opposed to a third-party 
claimant does not make her a party to the contract. 
A. Background of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Utah. 
The law in Utah with regard to direct claims against insurers is well-settled. In 
Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized a tort cause of action by an insured against his insurer for breach of an 
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obligation to bargain fairly in a third party context. Ammerman explained that an insurer has 
a fiduciary duty to defend its insured and that a breach of that duty gives rise to a separate 
cause of action for the insured against the insurer. The injured third party, however, is barred 
from suing the insurer because there is no privity of contract and the insurer owes the third 
party no duty. Id. at 577. 
In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an insured may sue his insurer for failure to deal fairly and in good faith in 
a first-party relationship and that the action is based on contract, not tort. The term "first-
party" refers to an insurance agreement where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to 
it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured. The term "third-party" refers to situations 
where the insurer contracts to defend the insured against claims made by third parties against 
the insured and to pay resulting liability up to a specified limit. Id. at 798, n.2. 
Importantly, in both the first and third party contexts, a "bad faith" claim is derived 
from the insurance contract. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises out 
of the contract and runs to the benefit of only those who are parties to the contract. Cannon 
is not a party to the contract with Travelers and has no contractual relationship with 
Travelers. 
B. Cannon Is Not An Insured Under The Travelers Policy, But Instead A Claimant 
Who Made a Claim For Medical Expenses. The Andersons9 Policy Included Medical 
Payments Coverage As Part Of The Liability Coverages Granted To The Andersons. 
Cannon claims that she was injured while she was a guest at the Anderson home and 
that she was therefore entitled to certain medical benefits under the Andersons' insurance 
policy. Cannon did not make a claim of negligence against the Andersons, but bases her 
claim for medical expenses on a provision in the Andersons' policy which provides coverage 
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for necessary medical expenses to others who are injured on the Andersons' premises. 
"Coverage F-Medical Payments To Others" is included as part of the liability coverages 
provided to the Andersons. It is part of "SECTION II-LIABILITY COVERAGES." 
(R.166 and Addendum 4 at p.26.) This medical payments to others coverage is an added 
benefit provided to the Andersons, providing payment of medical expenses to others in 
certain circumstances, without considering fault. The primary purpose for this type of 
coverage is to benefit the Andersons, as the homeowners, by providing a means for the 
insurer to pay relatively small, easily ascertainable medical expenses without a determination 
of fault. This may eliminate certain small claims that would otherwise be made against the 
insureds. See Zegar v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 570N.E.2d 1176 (111. App. 1991) where a slip 
and fall claimant brought a claim under a medical payments provision of a policy insuring 
the Sears premises. The court determined that the coverage was primarily for the benefit of 
the contracting parties and that there was nothing in the policy stating or suggesting that the 
claimant could sue the insurer. 
Importantly, there is nothing in Coverage F stating that a party injured on the named 
insureds' premises is an insured, and nothing grants such an injured person the right to sue 
Travelers. Further, Cannon, as a person claiming to have been injured on the Andersons' 
premises, is not defined as and does not qualify as an insured under the definitions of the 
policy. The terms "you" and "your" are defined on page 1 of the policy to mean the named 
insured shown in the declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household. (R. 153 
and Addendum 4 at p.l.) The declarations page of the policy designates the named insured 
as Aldon Scott and Jesselie Barlow Anderson. (R. 1166 at Ex. 1 and Addendum 4.) The term 
"insured" is defined on page 1 of the policy to mean "you [the Andersons] and residents of 
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your household" and other specified persons with regard to the operation of vehicles. 
Cannon does not qualify as an "insured" under the definitions. Cannon argues that certain 
duties are imposed upon an injured person in order to obtain medical payments and that no 
duties could be imposed unless the claimant were an insured. Cannon cites no authority for 
this statement. Obviously, if medical payments are going to be made to anyone, the insurer 
must have some proof concerning the claim. As expressly stated in the policy, the proof can 
be provided by the injured person or someone acting for the injured person. The fact that 
Travelers requires proof of the medical expenses, does not make the injured person an 
insured. 
Cannon asserts that she is an "unnamed insured" or "first-party insured" under the 
Travelers policy. It makes no difference how Cannon characterizes herself; she is not 
defined as or included as an insured under the policy. Aldon Scott and Jesselie Barlow 
Anderson are designated as the "named insureds" on the declarations page of the policy. 
Accordingly, they are the only named insureds. Other unnamed "insureds" are specifically 
defined in the policy to mean "residents of your household" and other specified persons with 
regard to the operation of vehicles. Some persons qualifying under the definition as an 
"insured" are not specifically named, but are specified as residents of the named insured's 
household and other specifically defined persons. The fact that some insureds are unnamed 
has no significance in this matter. What is significant is that Cannon does not fall within any 
of the definitions of "insured" under the policy. She is neither the named insured nor an 
"insured." Cannon's argument that she is an insured, but simply unnamed, is contrary to the 
policy language and is unsupported. This unsupported argument is simply an attempt to 
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create a contractual relationship where none exists.1 
Cannon further argues that Travelers claims adjuster, Mr. Tom Day, admitted that the 
policy gave first-party coverage to unnamed insureds. In the context of Day's deposition 
testimony, it can be seen that Mr. Day was acknowledging that a child or a resident of the 
named insured's household could make a first-party coverage claim as an insured under the 
policy, even though they are not the "named insured" under the policy. (R. 1166, at pp.40, 
41.) 
The policy language is clear and unambiguous. Cannon is not defined as an insured. 
The coverage for medical payments to others is part of the liability coverages purchased by 
the Andersons for the Andersons' protection. There is nothing granting an injured person 
the right to sue Travelers for the medical payments, and there is nothing that makes Cannon 
a party to the insurance contract or that creates contractual privity between Travelers and 
Cannon. 
C. Cannon's Argument That The Definition Of Insured Uses Words That Are Inclusive 
And The Definition Is Thereby Ambiguous Has Been Raised For The First Time On 
Appeal And Should Not Be Considered By This Court, The Argument Is Furthermore 
Erroneous. 
Cannon argues that by including any ADDITIONAL INSURED within the definition 
of insured for purposes of sections I and II of the policy, the definition of insured becomes 
1
 Cannon is also in error in her reference to other policy provisions, arguing that 
other individuals or entities are provided coverage without being defined as "insured." 
(See Appellant's Brief, p. 18, n.2.) As an example, Cannon references page 33 of the 
policy where "damage to property of others" is an additional coverage. This coverage is 
very clearly part of the liability coverage and applies when the damage is caused by an 
insured. Cannon also reaches erroneous conclusions on the other references. Further, the 
other references are inapplicable here as they relate to the property insurance section of 
the policy. As noted, the medical payments provision is part of the liability section. 
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ambiguous. Cannon's argument is that by defining "insured" under sections I and II to 
include any additional insured, the term "include" allows for Cannon to be considered an 
insured since the term include is one of enlargement rather than restriction. While this 
argument is erroneous, it should not be considered on appeal for the first time. It was not 
raised below in any of the memoranda filed by Cannon. It is fundamental that the trial court 
should have the first opportunity to address issues later raised on appeal, and that the 
appellate court should decline to consider arguments raised for the first time at the appellate 
level. Smith v. Iversen. 848 P.2d 677 (Utah 1993). One exception to this rule of appellate 
review is that the appellate court may affirm trial court decisions on any proper ground, even 
though the trial court assigned another reason for its ruling. Thus, an argument made for the 
first time on appeal will be considered if it will result in affirmance, but will not be 
considered if it will result in reversal. See State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah 
App. 1991). One reason for this rule has been stated by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final settlement of 
controversies, requires that a party must present his entire case and his theory 
or theories of recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot 
thereafter change to some different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion 
a merry-go-round of litigation. 
Bundv v. Century Equip. Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), quoting from Simpson v. 
General Motors Corp.. 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). 
Whether the point raised by Cannon is characterized as a new argument or a new issue 
makes no difference. See Ong International (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455, 
n.31 (Utah 1993). It should also be noted that the injection of new issues of fact into a case 
on appeal is improper and is reason to reject consideration of the issue. Zions First Nat. 
Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). Under sound rules of appellate 
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review, Cannon's new argument that the definition of insured is ambiguous and that she may 
therefore fall within the definition, should not be considered. 
Even if the court considers Cannon's new argument, the argument misreads plain 
language of the policy and is simply erroneous. Cannon's argument refers to subparagraph 
e. of the definition of insured, which states as follows: 
Under sections I and II, "insured" also includes: 
e. Any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the Declarations 
but only with respect to Coverages A, B, E, and F and only for 
the "residence premises". 
(See policy p.2, R.154 and Addendum 4.) Cannon first argues that under this definition, 
anyone named in the declarations is also an insured, which would have no meaning under 
coverage F for medical payments, since the "named insureds" are excluded from receiving 
benefits under coverage F. This argument blatantly misreads the policy language, by 
replacing the words "additional insured" with the words "named insured." There are simply 
no "additional insureds" listed in the declarations of the Andersons' policy. If the 
declarations did list additional insureds, they would be included as insureds under Section 
I and II. 
Cannon also apparently attempts to imply that she may be one of many insureds 
"included" within the definition of insured since the term "includes" is an inclusive term 
rather than an exclusive term. This argument again misreads plain language. As used in the 
above quoted provision, the term "includes" indeed enlarges the persons qualifying as 
insureds to include "any ADDITIONAL INSURED" named in the declarations. It enlarges 
the definition to include additional insureds named in the declarations in addition to those 
insureds defined in the preceding definitions. The definitions are clear and unambiguous and 
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should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. Cannon is plainly and simply not an 
insured under the policy. Furthermore, Cannon is not entitled to have any alleged ambiguity 
construed in her lavor in determining whether she is an insured. Aetna v. Aztec Plumbing, 
796 P.2d at 229. Cannon's argument that she is an "unnamed insured" or "first-party 
insured" should be rejected. 
D. Cannon Does Not Have The Requisite Contractual Relationship With Travelers To 
State A Claim for Alleged "Bad Faith/9 
Cannon argues that she is a first-party insured in an attempt to create some type of 
contractual relationship with Travelers. As demonstrated above, Cannon does not qualify 
as an insured whatsoever under the Travelers policy. Moreover, Cannon's argument misses 
the point. Cannon is not a party to the insurance contract between the Andersons and 
Travelers. There is no contractual relationship between Cannon and Travelers. She did not 
pay premiums and had no knowledge of the existence of the policy, and more specifically, 
no knowledge of the medical payments to others coverage, at the time of the alleged incident. 
Utah's appellate courts have consistently required contractual privity before recognizing an 
insurance "bad faith" claim. In acknowledging such claims in both Ammerman and Beck, 
the Utah Supreme Court's analysis made clear that the claim is derived from the insurance 
contract and is dependent upon the contractual relationship. After Beck, the Utah Court of 
Appeals reviewed a claim by an automobile accident victim against the tort-feasor's insurer, 
alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Pixton v. State 
Farm, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). The Court of Appeals first reiterated the rule that "in 
order to maintain an action under a contractual theory of insurer bad faith, the parties must 
be in privity of contract at the time of the alleged wrong." Pixton. at 749 (citing Arnica Mut. 
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Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), also citing Ammennan.) The Pixton 
court concluded that the injured party did not have a claim for breach of the implied covenant 
under either Beck or Ammerman and therefore could not bring such a claim. 
Thus, under Beck, State Farm owes Pixton no duty as there is no relevant 
contractual relationship. Neither is there a duty under Ammerman as there is 
no fiduciary relationship based on a covenant to defend. 
Pixton, at 749. 
Cannon suggests that the Utah cases do not cover the precise legal issue in this case 
and attempts to distinguish the several Utah cases that have addressed the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Cannon goes so far as to suggest that this case is most similar 
to the case of Campbell v. State Farm, 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992). In Campbell it was 
held that State Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured when a 
third-party claim was made and an excess judgment was obtained against the insured. 
Campbell thus involved a fiduciary relationship based upon a covenant to defend. Campbell 
has no similarity to the instant matter. 
Cannon ultimately urges this court to ignore Utah law and look to the law of other 
states, such as California. Cannon argues that privity of contract is not a requirement to 
allege a claim of insurer bad faith and has gone so far as to criticize the Utah Court of 
Appeals as being "off base" and stretching earlier rulings by requiring privity of contract in 
the case of Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. R.267. Despite Cannon's dissatisfaction with 
Utah law on this subject, the statement made in Arnica represents the law of the state of Utah 
and has been cited and reaffirmed by Utah's appellate courts on subsequent occasions. The 
Utah courts have held strictly to the rule that in order to maintain an action for insurer bad 
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faith, the parties must be in privity of contract. Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in a worker's compensation context in Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 
P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), affirming Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 874 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 
1994). Savage involved a claim by an injured employee against his employer's worker's 
compensation insurer for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme 
Court stated: 
We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that an action for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be brought only by a party to the 
insurance contract. This conclusion flows naturally from the decisions of this 
court in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), and 
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967). 
Id. at 865 (emphasis added). 
The injured employee in Savage argued that she had a contractual relationship with 
the insurer due to a statute requiring all worker's compensation insurance policies to contain 
a provision that employees may enforce, in their own name, the liability of the insurer. The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and held, despite the statutory and contractual right 
to sue the insurer directly, that because the employee had no contractual relationship with the 
insurer, she had no cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
or so called "bad faith." IdL at 866-7. 
The Supreme Court in Savage also addressed the practical impossibility of placing a 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing upon the insurer running toward both its 
insured and the injured third party. The court stated that: 
If. . . Educators [the insurer] were deemed to owe Savage [the claimant] a 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Educators would have an 
unresolvable conflict between its contractually-based duty to the district [its 
insured] and its so-called "contractual" duty to Savage. An insurer cannot be 
expected to zealously protect the interests of two parties with diametrically 
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opposed interests. 
Id. at 866. See also Pixton, where the Utah Court of Appeals quoted the Alaska Supreme 
Court in stating that an insurer could hardly have a fiduciary relationship both with the 
insured and a claimant because the interests of the two are often conflicting. Pixton, at 750. 
The instant case presents the same problem. If Travelers were deemed to owe Cannon a 
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, Travelers would have an unresolvable conflict 
between its contractually based duties to the Andersons, who purchased the policy, and its 
so-called "contractual" duty to Cannon. 
Utah's appellate courts have held steadfastly to the rule that no cause of action for 
"bad faith" exists absent contractual privity. On occasion, the Utah courts have characterized 
this as a requisite contractual relationship, sometimes referring to privity of contract, and 
sometimes referring to contractual relationship. The Utah Supreme Court most recently 
stated the rule clearly in Savage, indicating that the claimant must be a party to the contract. 
At the very least, the Utah courts have required a direct contractual relationship. Cannon 
recognizes that this rule, firmly established by both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals, means that she does not have a claim against Travelers for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. She has therefore attempted to minimize the 
statements of the Utah Court of Appeals and persuade this Court that none of the Utah cases 
outlining the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing govern this matter. To the contrary, 
the Utah decisions fully outline the scope of the duty and require contractual privity or a 
direct contractual relationship. Cannon does not have either in this matter and her claim 
against Travelers fails. 
Cannon goes to great lengths to characterize herself as an "unnamed insured" and a 
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"first-party insured." This is an attempt to put herself in the same class as persons who 
qualify as insureds under the policy, such as resident relatives. While it might be argued that 
certain "insureds" under the policy have a contractual relationship by virtue of being defined 
as an insured, Cannon does not qualify as such. Such insureds might include permissive 
users of automobiles under an automobile policy, resident relatives of the household, and 
other persons qualifying under the policy definitions as insureds. In the instant matter, 
Cannon does not so qualify. Her characterization of herself as an unnamed and/or first-party 
insured does not make her an insured under the policy and does not make her a party to the 
contract. 
Other courts have refused to extend the bad faith claim to "strangers" to the insurance 
contract. See Messina v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.. 998 F.2d 2,5 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and cases 
cited therein. See also, Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W. 2d 769 (Neb. 1991) 
(disapproved on other grounds in Wortman v. Unger. 578 N.W.2d 413 (Neb. 1993), where 
the Nebraska Supreme Court explained the difference between policy holder beneficiaries 
and non-policy holder beneficiaries. The Nebraska court explained that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is premised upon the contractual relationship, and that beneficiaries of 
the policy who are not policy holders should not have a claim for "bad faith." 
Utah's appellate courts have held firmly to the rule that no cause of action for "bad 
faith" exists absent contractual privity, despite the fact that certain other courts have 
recognized the duty in the absence of contractual privity. (See Justice Durham's dissent in 
Savage v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d at 868-9.) The Utah Supreme Court's requirement 
of contractual privity in Savage governs the instant case. Despite a statutory and contractual 
right of the employee to sue the insurer directly in Savage, the Supreme Court held that the 
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employee had no cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Thus, despite the appearance of a contractual relationship and an expressed 
contractual right to sue, the court held that the employee was "not in privity" and concluded 
that because the employee "is not in privity with Educators, she has no cause of action 
against Educators for so-called bad faith adjusting of her worker's compensation claim." 
Savage, at 867. 
Like Savage, Cannon has no direct contractual relationship or contractual privity with 
Travelers. Cannon argues that she has some claim for medical payments coverage under the 
policy, which she argues gives her some contractual relationship. In Savage, the injured 
employee had a contractual and statutory right to sue the insurer for benefits, but this was 
insufficient to create the contractual privity necessary to bring a cause of action for bad faith. 
Since Cannon is not a party to the contract, her claim for bad faith fails under well-
established Utah law. 
IV. CANNON'S ALLEGED THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY STATUS DOES NOT 
MAKE HER A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT AND DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO THE 
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Cannon argues that she is an intended beneficiary under the contract of insurance and 
thereby entitled to sue on the contract, citing as support Peterson v. Western Casualty & 
Surety Co.. 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 P.2d 769 (1967). In Peterson, however, the insurance 
contract itself contained a provision that a judgment creditor of the insured could bring a suit 
to compel payment of the judgment. As such, the plaintiff in Peterson was a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract expressly entitled to bring suit. The Travelers policy does not 
authorize a person such as Cannon to bring a suit on the policy. Under Utah law, a third-
party does not have enforceable rights under a contract unless that party is an intended 
- 2 8 -
beneficiary and the intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit 
is clear. Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989). One only 
incidentally benefitted by the contract may not maintain an action against the promisor. Id. 
As a general matter, an injured party is not treated as a third-party beneficiary under the tort-
feasor's insurance contract. Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah 1982). 
While Cannon did not assert a negligence claim against the Andersons, the possibility for 
such a claim existed. 
The case of Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993) is an 
example of a case where one may benefit from a contract but not be entitled to sue thereon. 
In Broadwater, the Supreme Court held that a third-party beneficiary to a bond, purchased 
on the chance that a lost stock certificate would be found, could not sue on the bond even 
though she was the lawful owner of the missing stock certificate. The Supreme Court stated 
that "nothing in the bond indicates that Fletcher or Northwestern [the parties to the bond] 
intended to confer on plaintiff the right to enforce payment." Id. at 537. Thus, although the 
plaintiff in Broadwater benefitted from the bond, the bond did not provide her with a right 
to enforce payment. She was therefore deemed an incidental beneficiary, who was not 
entitled to sue on the bond. 
Likewise, in Savage, the injured employee had a contractual, as well as a statutory, 
right to sue the insurer for benefits, but this was an insufficient contractual relationship to 
allow a cause of action for bad faith. Savage, at 866-7. 
Cannon may benefit from the medical payments coverage in the Travelers policy, but 
is not provided with a right of action against Travelers. The primary purpose of the medical 
payments coverage is to benefit the insured, the Andersons, under the policy by providing 
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for the payment of relatively small medical expenses when persons are injured on the 
premises, regardless of fault. See Zegar, 570 N.E.2d at 1179, where medical payments 
coverage was stated to be primarily for the benefit of the contracting parties and only 
incidentally for injured claimants. Moreover, even if Cannon is deemed an intended third-
party beneficiary of the medical payments coverage, Travelers submits that the intended 
benefit is only to the extent of the medical payments coverage limits. There is still no 
contractual privity and no contractual relationship with Travelers, and the third-party 
beneficiary would not have a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. If Cannon is deemed an intended third-party beneficiary, the intended 
benefit is the payment of the medical expenses, no more. There is certainly no indication in 
the policy to provide Cannon or other potential medical payments claimants who are not 
insureds, with any of the implied covenants flowing only between the parties to the contract. 
A case similar to the instant matter was recently decided by the South Carolina Court 
of Appeals. In Klecklev v. Northwestern Natl. Casualty Co.. 498 S.E. 2d 669 (S.C. App. 
1998), the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries in a fall while on the premises of WW 
Services. Northwestern insured the premises with a policy that covered up to $5,000 in 
medical expenses, regardless of fault. The plaintiff brought an action directly against 
Northwestern for payment of the medical expenses and for bad faith refusal to pay benefits 
she was allegedly due. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the 
plaintiff did not have standing to sue, holding that the plaintiff did not have a right to assert 
a claim for bad faith against the insurer because the plaintiff was not a party to the policy of 
insurance. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the South Carolina Supreme Court had 
recently recognized a cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay first party benefits under an 
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insurance contract, but stated that the "cause of action does not extend to a person who is not 
a party to or a named insured under the insurance contract and who possesses a mere 
contingent interest, such as an inchoate dower interest, in the property insured." Kleckley, 
at 671, quoting Carter v. American Mutual Fire Ins. Co.. 307 S.E. 2d 225, 227 (S.C. 1983). 
Cannon's asserted third-party beneficiary status does not make her a party to the 
contract. A third-party beneficiary is "one for whose benefit a promise is made in a contract 
but who is not a party to the contract." Blacks Law Dictionary. (5th Ed.). Third-party 
beneficiaries are those "recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract 
to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration." Broadwater, at 536. 
See also Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii. 922 P.2d 976, 980 (Haw. App. 1996). A third-
party beneficiary is not a party to the contract, and the beneficiary should not have a right to 
claim a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that runs only between 
parties to the contract. The rights of the third-party beneficiary should be strictly limited to 
the benefit that the parties to the contract intended to confer, which is simply the payment 
of medical expenses. 
V. THE OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY CANNON ARE NOT 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW. 
Cannon relies upon cases from other jurisdictions and cites to other alleged legal 
authorities for the proposition that med pay claimants should be entitled to assert a bad faith 
claim. The case law and other authorities relied upon by Cannon are readily distinguished 
or are inconsistent with Utah law on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing It 
must be emphasized that Utah's approach to the implied covenant and the so-called insurer 
bad faith claim is different than the approach taken by other states. The Utah Supreme Court 
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specifically rejected the approach taken by the majority of states. In Beck, 701 P.2d 795 
(Utah 1985), the court rejected the majority position which permitted an insured in a "first 
party" situation to institute a tort action against an insurer. IdL at 798. The Utah courts have 
specifically tied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the contractual 
relationship existing between the contracting parties. Id at 800; and Savage v. Educators Ins. 
Co., 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995). Cannon's reliance upon case law from other 
jurisdictions and other authorities is therefore misplaced. 
It is also important that in Utah, a third-party does not have enforceable rights under 
a contract unless that party is an intended beneficiary. The intent of the contracting parties 
to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear. Ron Case Roofing v. Blomquist 773 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989). A person may benefit from the contract, but be considered 
only an incidental beneficiary who is not entitled to sue on the contract. Id In the instant 
matter, Cannon may benefit from the medical payments provision in the Travelers policy, 
but is not provided with a right to sue on the policy. Cannon's benefit is incidental, as the 
primary benefit of the medical payments coverage is for the insureds who contracted for the 
benefit. Even if Cannon is deemed to be an intended third-party beneficiary of the medical 
payments coverage, the intended benefit is only that medical expenses by paid. There is no 
indication in the contract that the contracting parties, Travelers and the Andersons, intended 
to confer the separate and distinct benefit of the implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing that exist only between parties to the contract. Most importantly, even if Cannon is 
deemed a third-party beneficiary of the medical payments coverage, Cannon still has no 
contractual privity with Travelers and is therefore not entitled to make a claim for insurer bad 
faith under Utah law. gee Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 
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1967); Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P,2d 795 (Utah 1985); Pixton v. State 
Farm. 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991); Savage v. Educators Ins. Co.. 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 
1995). 
The cases set forth by Cannon do not represent Utah law and should not be followed. 
Even if they are followed to the extent of deeming Cannon a third-party beneficiary to the 
medical payments coverage, however, contractual privity is still lacking and Cannon should 
not be entitled to assert an insurance bad faith claim under Utah law. The cases relied upon 
by Cannon are nevertheless readily distinguished on their facts or the particular state law at 
issue. 
In Donald v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.. 18 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1994) the court determined 
under Indiana law that a claimant to medical payment benefits was a third-party beneficiary 
to those benefits and could sue to enforce that provision of the contract. The court further 
held that the insurer owed the third-party beneficiary the same duty of good faith and fair 
dealing that it would owe its insured in Indiana. The court so held despite acknowledging 
that persons entitled to medical payment benefits under the contract were not "insureds" 
under the contract. Id. at 478. This determination is contrary to the law set forth in Utah 
which requires privity of contract or a direct contractual relationship to make a claim for 
breach of the implied covenant. It should further be noted that Indiana follows the majority 
rule allowing a tort cause of action for bad faith in first-party cases, completely contrary to 
Utah law. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman bv Smith. 622 N.E. 2d 515 (Ind. 1993), and Ashley, 
Bad Faith Actions §2:15 (2d ed. 1997). 
The case of Donaldson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 947 F.Supp. 429 (D. Hawaii 1996) 
involved a claim for automobile no-fault insurance benefits under Hawaii law. The covered 
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person was not defined as an insured in the no-fault insurance statute, but the court found that 
he was "essentially an insured" and therefore allowed the bad faith cause of action. Id. at 
431. Under Utah law, a no-fault insurance claimant is an insured and entitled to sue by virtue 
of statute and also the policy language. It is also significant that the Hawaii court held that 
third-party beneficiaries of an insurance contract are entitled to the same benefits under the 
contract as insureds. This is contrary to Utah law, which has consistently required 
contractual privity. Further, Hawaii also follows the majority view, allowing a tort cause of 
action in first-party bad faith cases. See Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 
334 (Haw. 1996). 
Interestingly, in another Hawaii case, decided by the Hawaii Court of Appeals, a med 
pay claimant was found to be an intended third-party beneficiary of the med pay coverage, 
but the trial court's granting of summary judgment to the insurer on the bad faith claim was 
apparently affirmed. In Hunt v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 922 P.2d 976 (Haw. App. 1996), 
the Court of Appeals indicated that it was vacating that part of the order granting summary 
judgment that precluded the breach of contract claim, but affirmed all other parts of the 
order. Id at 986. The court stated that the rights of the third-party beneficiary must be 
limited to the terms of the promise. Id. at 980. 
The case of Harper v. Wausau Ins. Corp., 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 64 (Cal. App. 1997) also 
relied upon by Cannon, is based upon California law. Beck specifically rejected the 
approach taken by the California Supreme Court in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 
1032 (Cal. 1973). Beck, at 798. It must be further noted that Harper did not address the 
issue of whether the plaintiff would have a bad faith claim, but merely found that the plaintiff 
was a third-party beneficiary of a medical payments provision. Interestingly, the Harper 
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court acknowledged that the California Supreme Court holds that "a third-party should not 
be permitted to enforce covenants made not for his benefit, but rather for others. He is not 
a contracting party; his right to performance is predicated on the contracting parties' intent 
to benefit him." Harper, at 68. 
In Cancino v. Farmers Ins. Group, 145 Cal.Rptr. 503 (Cal. App. 1978) the California 
Court analyzed a claim made by an insured under the uninsured motorist coverage of the 
policy. The plaintiff in Cancino fell within the policy definition of insured. Likewise, in 
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers, 143 Cal.Rptr. 415 (Cal. App. 1978), the court found 
that a permissive user of an automobile fell within the policy definition of insured. These 
cases have no bearing on the instant matter. First, they are based upon California law, which 
has been expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. Second, the cases involved persons 
who were defined as "insureds" under the insurance contract and were therefore in an 
arguable contractual relationship with the insurer. 
In Prvgrocki v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Co.. 407 So.2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), 
the Florida court was determining whether or not a pedestrian entitled to personal injury 
protection coverage under a policy was entitled to recover attorney's fees under a particular 
Florida statute. In State Farm v. Kambara. 667 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) the Florida 
court again was analyzing whether or not a person was entitled to attorney's fees under the 
Florida statute. The court determined that the plaintiff qualified as an omnibus insured under 
the Florida statute entitling omnibus insureds to attorney's fees. The Florida courts 
apparently distinguish between omnibus insureds who are entitled to attorney's fees under 
the statute and third-party beneficiaries who are not so entitled. See Kambara. at 832, n.l. 
There is no similar statute under Utah law and these cases have no bearing on this matter. 
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Cannon also relies upon the case of Hammond v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co.. 1994 WL 
521193 (Ohio App. 1994). Hammond apparently stands for the proposition in Ohio that a 
beneficiary of medical payments coverage may bring an action against the insurer for bad 
faith. Hammond is not in line with Utah cases outlining the insurance bad faith claim. An 
insurers duty of good faith and fair dealing in Ohio does not arise because of the contractual 
relationship between the insurer and the insured. Further, a breach of the duty gives rise to 
a cause of action in tort against the insurer. Both of these concepts are completely contrary 
to Utah law as stated in Beck and its progeny. 
Cannon further argues that a claim for med pay is similar to a claim for no-fault 
benefits or uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile policy. There is a crucial 
difference between no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist coverage under an automobile 
policy and med pay benefits under the subject Travelers policy. Under Utah law, no-fault 
coverage [personal injury protection coverage] and uninsured motorist coverage are required 
components of motor vehicle insurance policies. See Utah Code Ann. §§31A-22-302(2), 
305, 306. As such, a person entitled to no-fault benefits or uninsured motorist coverage is 
an insured by statute and by definition in the policy. 
VI. THE UNFAIR CLAIM SETTLEMENT PRACTICES STATUTES AND RULES, 
INDUSTRY STANDARDS, EXPERT TESTIMONY AND OTHER ALLEGED 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES CANNOT CREATE THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
Utah case law has established when the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing exists. The Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Rule does not create any private cause 
of action. Likewise, industry standards and expert opinion cannot establish when the implied 
duty arises. 
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A. The Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Statutes And Rules Do Not Give Rise To A 
Claim For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing. 
The fourth cause of action of plaintiff s first amended complaint was based upon the 
unfair claims settlement practices statute found in Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-303 and the 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Rule promulgated by the Insurance Commission in Rule 
590-89-1 et seq., Utah Administrative Code. Travelers denies Cannon's allegations that the 
statutes and rules were violated. However, even if violated, the statutes and rules do not give 
rise to a private cause of action and do not create a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which 
duty arises only between parties to the insurance contract. 
The statutes and rules relied upon by Cannon are regulatory in nature and enforcement 
thereof is strictly for the Insurance Commission. Section 31A-26-303 of the Utah Code 
expressly states in subsection (5) that "this section does not create any private cause of 
action." Similarly, the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Rule states, under the section 
defining the scope of the rule, that "this rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended to 
create a private right of action." See R590-89-3, Utah Administrative Code. 
Even the California Supreme Court, which at one time held that a private cause of 
action could be stated under the California Unfair Claims Settlement Practices statute, has 
since reversed its position. In Moradi-Shalal v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co.. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 
1988), the California Supreme court overruled its earlier decision in Royal Globe Ins. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979). In Moradi-Shalal the California Supreme 
Court acknowledged that 17 of 19 states considering the issue had refused to recognize a 
private cause of action arising out of the statutes and rules adopted in the various states from 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Unfair Claims Practices Act. 
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Moradi-Shalal at 63. See also Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 
235 (Minn. 1986), where the Minnesota court stated that the great majority of state versions 
of the model act have been held not to create a private cause of action. 
Cannon may not utilize the unfair claims settlement practices statutes and rules to 
establish a claim for bad faith. The statutes and rules do not give rise to a private cause of 
action and do not establish a legal duty where none exists otherwise. Cannon references a 
footnote in Beck indicating that in some cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may 
also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract, where the court noted that 
there may be statutory requirements that give rise to independent causes of action. 
Importantly, Beck acknowledged that the duties and obligations between the parties to the 
contract are contractual rather than fiduciary, and without more, a breach of those implied 
or expressed duties gives rise to only a cause of action in contract. Beck, at 800. The court's 
footnote seemingly acknowledges that there may be intentional torts that could arise 
independently of the contract. The footnote in Beck has absolutely no application to the 
instant matter. 
Cannon again inaccurately describes testimony from Tom Day, asserting that 
Travelers testified that any violation, omission, or deviation of such standards would 
constitute improper claims handling and violations of its own standards. Mr. Day simply 
testified that the regulations deal with appropriate claims handling, and that Travelers' claim 
representatives are trained to handle claims properly and fairly. R.l 166 at p. 15-19. 
Cannon's citation to the Insurance Fraud Act, Utah Code Ann. §31A-31-103, is also 
misguided. The Insurance Fraud Act, by its terms, does not abrogate or modify common 
law, but likewise does not create any civil legal duties where none previously existed. 
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Moreover, there is no evidence that Travelers violated the act, and the act is wholly 
inapplicable to this matter. 
B, Industry Standards And Expert Opinions Do Not Create The Implied Covenant Of 
Good Faith And Fair Dealing. 
Cannon argues that it is the industry standard to treat unnamed insureds as first-party 
claimants with all the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. Whether or not this is 
industry standard has no relevance to the pending issues. Whether or not the implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing existed between Travelers and Cannon is a question of law for 
the court. Cf. First Security Bank v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). The 
duty of good faith and fair dealing under Utah law is dependent upon contractual privity or 
a direct contractual relationship. Cannon argues that Travelers admitted that unnamed 
insureds are owed the same duties of fair and proper claims handling as are owed to named 
insureds, citing to the deposition of Travelers' claims adjuster, Thomas Day. Mr. Day's 
testimony explained that a resident relative of the named insured's household could qualify 
as an "insured" under the policy and have a first party claim in certain instances. R.l 166 at 
40-42. Cannon has attempted to categorize herself as an "unnamed insured" in order to make 
herself an insured under the policy when she does not qualify as such under the definitions. 
Some persons qualifying as "insureds" under the definitions are not specifically named, but 
are specified as residents of the named insured's household and other specifically defined 
persons. Cannon does not fall within any of the definitions of "insured". She is neither the 
named insured nor an "insured," named or unnamed. 
Cannon also relies upon testimony by her expert witness, Gary Fye. Fye's testimony 
should not be considered by this court, as it is replete with unsubstantiated opinions, 
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argumentative statements and legal conclusions. See Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,859 
(Utah 1983): and Gaw v. State bv and through DOT. 798 P.2d 1130.1137 (Utah App. 1990). 
Travelers hereby incorporates by reference its Motion to Strike Affidavit Testimony and 
supporting memoranda. (R. 1030-1040; 1125-1133.) Furthermore, expert testimony cannot 
create a legal duty between Travelers and Cannon. The duties are created by contract and 
by law, and the existence or lack of a duty is a question of law for the court. Cannon again 
inaccurately cites to the record asserting that Travelers has admitted that such industry 
standards are proper and have been made a part of Travelers own internal policies. Cannon's 
assertion is unsupported by the record. 
Regardless of the inadmissibility of the affidavit of Gary Fye, the testimony of Gary 
Fye, and the testimony of other witnesses cannot create a legal duty where none exists. The 
statements and opinions by Mr. Fye, even if admissible, assume the existence of a legal duty. 
Fye can testify only to an alleged breach of duty once a legal duty has been determined by 
the court. 
Cannon further improperly relies upon three alleged experts citing to a treatise on 
insurance bad faith litigation. Cannon cites this court to Shernoff, Gage, Levine, Insurance 
Bad Faith Litigation, for the proposition that "since the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
arises from an insurers relationship to its insured, rather than its status as a party to the 
contract, the scope of that duty is not strictly defined by the terms of the contract." This 
statement by the authors, Shernoff, Gage and Levine, is directly contrary to Utah law on the 
issue and should be summarily rejected. Furthermore, none of the authors' opinions 
represent legal authority. In fact, the treatise merely represents opinions by three California 
lawyers who advocate insurance bad faith claims. See Shernoff, Gage, Levine, Insurance 
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Bad Faith Litigation, p.xix. 
In summary, Cannon suggests that this court follow the opinions of so-called experts 
in the industry as opposed to the well-established Utah law on the issue of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Cannon relies upon expert opinion and the law of 
other jurisdictions to advocate a change in Utah law, as the established law in this state does 
not allow Cannon to assert a claim against Travelers for bad faith. This case is governed by 
Utah law and the other authorities relied upon by Cannon should be rejected. 
VII. THE VALIDITY OF CANNON'S CLAIM WAS FAIRLY DEBATABLE, 
THEREBY ELIMINATING ANY CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the duties attendant to the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in Beck. Beck further established a fairly debatable defense to a claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Billings, at 465. Thus, when an 
insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it and cannot be held to 
have breached the implied covenant. Id The court further held that the duty of good faith 
runs both ways - that the insured and the insurer have parallel obligations to perform the 
contract in good faith. Beck, at 801. 
Travelers submits that Cannon cannot assert a claim for alleged breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Cannon was not a party to the contract with 
Travelers. Even assuming contractual privity between Cannon and Travelers, however, 
Cannon's claim was fairly debatable, and Travelers was entitled to debate it and cannot be 
held to have breached the implied covenant. Furthermore, Cannon would have owed a 
parallel duty of good faith and fair dealing and breached any such duty by intentionally 
withholding any information about the claim and her alleged injury from both Travelers and 
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Travelers' insureds, the Andersons. It is undisputed that Cannon avoided mentioning the 
alleged injury to the Andersons in order to maintain a friendly relationship so that Cannon's 
family might benefit from the Andersons' testimony in unrelated litigation involving the 
estate of Cannon's sister. Cannon avoided telling the Andersons of any problem for several 
months and notice of the alleged claim to Travelers was delayed even further. Cannon 
withheld any mention of the incident or of any alleged pain or injury despite having seen the 
Andersons socially between the date of the incident and Cannon's surgery. This withholding 
of information combined with the fact that Jesselie Anderson noticed nothing amiss either 
at the time of the incident or thereafter, caused the Andersons to question how the injury 
could be due to the greeting incident between Cannon and the Andersons' ten year old 
daughter at their home. This scenario also caused Travelers to question the claim. In 
response, Cannon provided only a letter from her doctor which indicated that her condition 
"could have" been related to the incident in August 1992. 
Travelers submits that even if Travelers and Cannon shared contractual privity, 
Cannon breached her parallel duty of good faith. More importantly, the claim was fairly 
debatable. The nature of the incident itself gave rise to a fair debate. Cannon's actions in 
intentionally withholding information from Travelers and the Andersons furthered the 
debatable nature of the claim. As such, Travelers cannot be held to have breached any 
alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 
(Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment 
to an insurer based upon the fairly debatable defense in a first party bad faith action. The 
court stated: 
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If the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there 
exists a debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the 
claim, and eliminating the bad faith claim. "When a claim is fairly debatable, 
the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the debate concerns a matter of fact 
or law." [citation omitted] 
Id. at 842 (emphasis added). 
In the case of Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263 (Utah App. 1993) the Court 
of Appeals again determined that an insurer's position was fairly debatable as a matter of law 
and that the first party insured's bad faith claim failed. Id. at 266. Most recently, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Billings stated that, "whether an insured's claim is fairly debatable under 
a given set of facts is also a question of law." Billings, at 464. 
Cannon's claim that her medical expenses were necessitated by the incident at the 
Anderson home was fairly debatable as a matter of law. The nature of the incident itself gave 
rise to a fairly debatable issue. Cannon claimed that her herniated disc and subsequent 
surgery were necessitated by an incident where the Andersons' ten year old daughter threw 
her arms around Cannon as Cannon bent over to hug her. Cannon failed to express any 
discomfort or pain at the time although she claimed later to have been in immediate pain. 
Jesselie Anderson, who was present at the time of the greeting incident, noticed nothing 
amiss and questioned the relationship of Cannon's back condition to the incident. (R. 166 at 
pp.89,90.) Cannon then continued to withhold any information from the Andersons for 
several months in order to maintain favor with them as witnesses in other litigation. When 
Cannon presented her claim to Travelers and the dispute concerning the claim could not be 
resolved, Cannon filed suit. Travelers claims adjuster, Mr. Day, obtained records from 
Cannon's physician, Dr. Hecht. He also obtained a statement from the treating physician, 
Dr. J. Lynn Smith, which indicated only that the incident in August of 1992 could have 
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subsequently led to the disc rupture and surgical intervention. None of the evidence 
indicated a likelihood or probability that Cannon's back condition was caused by the August 
1992 incident. It was not until well after the suit had been filed that Cannon provided the 
affidavits from her parents and sister confirming that Cannon had complained to them 
immediately following the incident. At this point, although causation was still debatable, 
Travelers paid its medical payment limits to Cannon in order to resolve her claim. 
The foregoing circumstances create fairly debatable issues surrounding Cannon's 
claim for necessary medical expenses and Travelers was entitled to debate the claim. 
Pursuant to the law in Callioux. if a debatable reason for denial of the claim existed, the 
denial is legitimized and the bad faith claim is eliminated. There can be no bad faith on the 
part of Travelers under the circumstances of this matter. The trial court's granting of 
summary judgment to Travelers dismissing Cannon's claim for bad faith should be affirmed 
on this ground even if it is determined that Cannon had contractual privity with Travelers and 
was entitled to assert a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
VIII. A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INSURER "BAD FAITH" WITHOUT DIRECT 
CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY HAS NOT BEEN RECOGNIZED IN UTAH. IF SUCH 
A CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOW EXTENDED TO CLAIMANTS WHO ARE NOT 
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT AND DO NOT HAVE CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY, 
TRAVELERS SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO HAVE BREACHED A DUTY THAT 
HAS NOT HERETOFORE BEEN RECOGNIZED UNDER UTAH LAW. 
It has been established law in Utah that a claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing can arise in only two circumstances. The first is where an insurer 
breaches its fiduciary duty to its own insured where the insured has been sued by an injured 
third party, as recognized in Ammerman. The second is where an insurer breaches its duty 
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of good faith and fair dealing to its own insured with regard to a first party claim by the 
insured as recognized in Beck. Both circumstances require a direct contractual relationship 
between the insured and the insurer. The duty exists only between parties to the contract and 
arises only out of the contractual relationship. Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly 
analyzed claims for insurer bad faith against the Ammerman and Beck cases and where 
neither case supports the claim, the claim has failed. See Broadwater, at 535; Pixton, at 749; 
and Savage, at 866. 
The Utah courts have not extended the duty of good faith and fair dealing to third-
party beneficiaries or to so called "unnamed" insureds. If a cause of action for insurer "bad 
faith" is now recognized to extend to someone in Cannon's position, it is a duty that has not 
previously been recognized in Utah. If the duty is so extended, Travelers should not be held 
to have breached any such duty since it has not heretofore been recognized under Utah law. 
IX. TRAVELERS PAID THE LIMITS OF THE MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
COVERAGE TO CANNON, AND FURTHER PAID CANNON'S CLAIM FOR 
COSTS. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
CLAIM TO RECOVER MEDICAL BENEFITS. NO FURTHER CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE EXPRESS CONTRACT TERMS EXISTS. 
The second cause of action of the plaintiffs first amended complaint alleged 
entitlement to reimbursement of medical expenses up to the $10,000 limit provided for 
medical payments in the policy. Travelers paid the limit of its medical payments coverage 
once it obtained further evidence from Cannon that her back surgery may have been causally 
related to the greeting incident at the Anderson home. 
As part of her claim, Cannon also sought consequential damages under the second 
cause of action for the alleged breach of the obligation to pay medical expenses. Such 
damages are not available for breach of the express terms of the contract. In Beck, the Utah 
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Supreme Court concluded that a first party insurer who breaches the implied covenant by 
unreasonably denying the insured benefits may be held liable for broad consequential 
damages foreseeably caused by the breach. In the more recent case of Billings v. Union 
Bankers Ins. Co. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), the court held that consequential damages are 
available only for breach of the implied covenant, not for breach of the express terms of the 
contract. The court stated: 
Union Bankers asserts that this expanded consequential damage measure 
should be available only for breach of the implied covenant, not, as the trial 
court instructed the jury, for breach of the express terms of the contract. We 
agree.. . . It would not further Beck's purpose of encouraging insurers to act 
reasonably if we were to impose the broad consequential damages allowed in 
Beck on every insurer who is ultimately determined by a court to have 
incorrectly denied coverage, regardless of how reasonable the denial. Such an 
insurer ought to incur no greater damage exposure than any other person 
breaching the express terms of a contract. 
Id. at 466 (emphasis added). 
Following the trial court's granting of partial summary judgment, the parties settled 
the remaining part of the second cause of action, which settlement included the payment of 
Cannon's claim for costs, attorney's fees, and interest in connection with the claim to recover 
medical benefits. The parties then stipulated to an order of dismissal with prejudice on the 
remaining claim. (R.l 151 and Addendum 2 and 3.) Other consequential damages are not 
available for breach of the express terms of a contract. Thus, even assuming privity of 
contract between Cannon and Travelers and the right to sue on the part of Cannon, there is 
no further claim under the express terms of the contract. The broad consequential damages 
sought by Cannon are available, if at all, only for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
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X. PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF AN 
INSURANCE BAD FAITH CLAIM TO A MEDICAL PAYMENTS CLAIMANT 
WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT AND HAS NO CONTRACTUAL 
PRIVITY WITH THE INSURER 
The medical payments coverage under the Travelers policy is part of the liability 
coverages obtained by the Andersons for their protection. It allows the insurer to pay certain 
small claims for medical expenses regardless of issues of fault. This may avoid certain tort 
claims that might otherwise be brought against the insureds by third parties. This medical 
payments coverage, unlike the no-fault coverage and uninsured motorist coverage which 
Cannon erroneously contends is similar, is not mandated by statute. It is a voluntary 
coverage provided by insurers to their insureds under certain homeowners policies. The 
nature of the coverage is therefore vastly different from no-fault coverage and uninsured 
motorist coverage where such coverages are mandated by statute and the beneficiaries of 
such coverages are defined as insureds in the applicable statutes and in the contracts of 
insurance. 
The medical payments provision of the Travelers policy provides for the payment of 
certain medical expenses that are incurred because of an accident causing bodily injury to 
others, i.e., third parties. Such other persons could be relatives who are not residents of the 
household, such as Cannon. They can also be complete strangers, such as solicitors, 
newspaper or mail carriers, or even an unknown jogger who claimed to have tripped on the 
sidewalk adjoining the insured location. The extension of a cause of action for bad faith, as 
advocated by Cannon to such a broad and unknown class of third parties is unwarranted and 
against public policy. Public policy should encourage the writing of this type of coverage 
for the benefit of the insureds who obtained the policy of insurance. If an insurer is subject 
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to bad faith claims by such a broad array of third parties, who are strangers to the policy, it 
will likely have an undesirable chilling effect upon the writing of such medical payments 
coverage. This coverage is not a required component of homeowners insurance policies and 
insurers would simply be better off not to write the coverage than be exposed to a potential 
endless variety of bad faith insurance claims. Indeed, insurers would be placed in a position 
such that they could be faced with a bad faith insurance claim anytime they debate payment 
under the medical payments provision. The potential plaintiffs to such claims would be 
endless. Such claims are not in the interest of the public of the state of Utah. 
Travelers submits that there is no reason to stray from the Utah appellate cases which 
have held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists only between parties to the 
contract, i.e., those who are in privity of contract. Cannon was not a party to the insurance 
policy with Travelers and the Andersons. She paid no premium for the policy, and indeed 
had no expectation of having any coverage for medical payments regardless of fault on the 
part of the insureds, the Andersons. Her benefits should be limited to the payment of medical 
expenses. There is no indication by the contracting parties to make such a claimant a party 
to the contract and to all implied covenants. There is no sound reason to extend a bad faith 
insurance claim to such third parties, and public policy would dictate against such an 
extension of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Cannon is not a party to the insurance contract and is therefore not entitled to allege 
an insurance bad faith claim. The district court did not commit error in granting summary 
judgment and dismissing Cannon's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. The district court's decision should be affirmed on any proper ground. 
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Even if Cannon is deemed to be a first-party insured under the contract, intended third-party 
beneficiary, or otherwise deemed entitled to bring suit against Travelers, her claim should 
be limited to the benefit intended by the parties to the contract. The implied covenant should 
be reserved for only those who are parties to the contract. Further, even if Cannon is entitled 
to assert an insurance bad faith claim, Cannon's claim was fairly debatable as a matter of law 
and any bad faith claim should therefore be dismissed. Travelers seeks affirmance of the 
district court's order granting summary judgment. 
DATED this / f ^ d a y of A*n I , 1999. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
T^KRY M. PLANT 
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity Company 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
(801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA CANNON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940906295PI 
i Judge William A. Thome 
The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant, The 
Travelers Indemnity Company, came on for hearing before the Court 
pursuant to notice on Monday, November 10, 1997, at 10:00 a.m., 
with the Honorable William A. Thorne presiding. Defendant The 
Travelers Indemnity Company was represented by its counsel, John N. 
Braithwaite, and Plaintiff Carla Cannon was represented by her 
counsel, L. Rich Humpherys and Nathan D. Alder. The Court, having 
considered the motion for summary judgment, having reviewed the 
memoranda and exhibits filed in support of the motion, the 
memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in opposition to the 
motion, having heard arguments of counsel, being fully advised as 
to the matters at issue, and finding good cause therefor, 
1 
F,LfhD DISTRICT COURT Th/rd Judicial District 
DEC 1 0 mi 
SALT LA 
HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
First Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is 
granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on 
the First Cause of Action on the ground that the Plaintiff lacks 
contractual privity with the Defendant and is not defined as an 
insured in the policy, and that the Plaintiff cannot maintain the 
action without being a party to the insurance contract or being 
defined as an insured under the policy. The Court finds that a 
right to sue for medical benefits, without contractual privity, 
does not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that exists between parties to the contract. The Court finds that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 
First Cause of Action with prejudice and on the merits. 
2. That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
Second Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
is denied to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees 
and litigation expenses incurred in pursuing her claim for 
reimbursement of medical expenses up to the point when the 
$10,000.00 policy limit for medical expenses was paid, and further 
seeks interest on the medical expenses up to the point when they 
were paid. The motion for summary judgment is granted on the 
remaining part of the Second Cause of Action, which seeks other 
consequential damages, and the same is dismissed with prejudice and 
2 
on the merits, there being no genuine issue as to any material 
fact. The broad consequential damages sought are not available for 
breach of express terms of the contract. 
3. That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
Third Cause of Action of the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is 
granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on 
the Third Cause of Action on the ground that the Plaintiff lacks 
privity of contract with the Defendant and that an action for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be 
brought only by a party to the insurance contract. The Court finds 
that the Plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract, and 
further is not defined as an insured in the policy. The Court 
finds that the right to sue for medical expenses under the policy 
does not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that exists between parties to the contract. The court finds that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 
Third Cause of Action and all claims of the Plaintiff for alleged 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with 
prejudice and on the merits. 
4. That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
Fourth Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
is granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on 
3 
the Fourth Cause of Action on the ground that alleged violations of 
the Utah Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statutes and rules do 
not give rise to any private cause of action. The Court finds that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 
Fourth Cause of Action with prejudice and on the merits. 
Dated this /O ^day of ^fc^-~ , 1997 
BY THE COURT: 
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Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity Company 
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Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA CANNON, 
v. 
THE TRAVELERS 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, ] 
INDEMNITY 
Defendant. 
( STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
1 PREJUDICE 
) Civil No. 940906295PI 
) Judge William A. Thorne 
Plaintiff Carla Cannon, through her counsel, L. Rich 
Humpherys, and Defendant The Travelers Indemnity Company, through 
its counsel, John N. Braithwaite, hereby stipulate and agree that 
the parties have settled the remaining portion of the Second 
Cause of Action of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and that 
the remaining portion of the Second Cause of Action should 
accordingly be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
The settlement of said claim included the payment of 
Plaintiff's claim for costs and attorney's fees in connection 
with the claim to recover the medical benefits under the policy, 
• • • • - ' • . i 
Third Judici*.1 uis^lot 
and no further costs or attorney's fees should be awarded in 
connection with this dismissal. This stipulation for dismissal 
is intended to apply only to Plaintiff's claims for attorney's 
fees, costs, expenses and interest arising from the Plaintiff's 
claim for recovery of medical expenses as set forth in the Second 
Cause of Action of the First Amended Complaint, and does not 
affect Plaintiff's right to appeal the dismissal of Plaintiff's 
claims previously dismissed by this Court on December 10, 1997. 
The parties jointly move the Court for an order dismissing 
the remaining Second Cause of Action with prejudice and upon the 
merits in accordance with this stipulation. 
Dated this %.J^ day of Ayr<S , 1998. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintii/f, 
Carla Cannon 
Dated this / 7 ^ d a y of Apri I , 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C. 
q$m N. BRAITHWAITE 
Attorney for Defendant, 
The Travelers Indemnity Company 
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HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity Company 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA CANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS 
Civil No. 940906295PI 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Based upon the stipulation and motion of the parties, and 
finding good cause therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
remaining portion of Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action contained 
in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits, the parties having resolved the 
claim by agreement. No costs or attorney's fees are awarded to 
either party in connection with dismissal of the Second Cause of 
Action. This dismissal shall apply only to Plaintiff's claims 
for attorney's fees, costs, expenses and interest arising from 
the Plaintiff's claim for medical benefits as set forth in the 
Second Cause of Action of the First Amended Complaint, and does 
not affect Plaintiff's right to appeal the dismissal of 
Plaintiff's claims previously dismissed by this Court on December 
10, 1997. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there is no further claim 
remaining in this matter for adjudication by this Court, and this 
order, together with the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, 
dated December 10, 1997, is the final order of this Court in this 
action. 
DATED this 3<Q ~~ day of > ^ ^ ^ / 1998. 
BY THE COURT: _ 
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HOMEOWNERS POLICY 
The Travelers Insurance Companies 
Hartford, Connecticut 
(Each a Stock Insurance Company) 
AGREEMENT 
For payment of premiums when due, and subject 
to all the terms of this policy, we will provide the 
coverages you have selected. These are indicated 
by premium entries in the Declarations. The 
amounts of insurance (limits of liability) you 
have chosen are also shown there. The Declara-
tions is a part of this policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
In this policy, "you"
 a n c i "your" refer to the 
NAMED INSURED shown in the Declarations and 
the spouse if a resident of the same household. 
"We", "us" and "our" refer to the member com-
pany of The Travelers providing this insurance 
and shown as the INSURER in the Declarations. 
In addition, certain other words and phrases, 
when printed in quotation marks, have specific 
meanings when used in this policy. These are de-
fined as follows: 
1. "bodily injury" means bodily harm, sick-
ness or disease, including required care, 
loss of services and death that results. 
"Bodily injury" also includes "personal in-
jury'*. 
2. "business" includes trade, profession or 
occupation. 
3. "clerical office employee" means an em-
ployee whose duties are clerical and 
wholly confined to an office. It does not 
mean any "insured" who owns or finan-
cially controls a "business" or who is a 
partner or member of a partnership that 
owns or financially controls a "business". 
4. " insured" means you and residents of 
your household who are: 
1 
a. your relatives; or 
b. other persons under the age of 21 and in 
the care of any person named above. 
Under Section II, "insured" also means: 
c. with respect to animals or watercraft to 
which this policy applies, any person or 
organization legally responsible for 
these animals or watercraft which are 
owned by you or any person included in 
4.a. or 4.b. above. A person or organiza-
tion using or having custody of these 
animals or watercraft in the course of 
any "business" or without consent of 
the owner is not an "insured"; 
d. with respect to any vehicle to which 
this policy applies: 
(1) persons while engaged in your em-
ploy or that of any person included 
in 4.a. or 4.b. above; or 
(2) other persons using the vehicle on 
an "insured location" with your 
consent. 
Under Sections I and II, "insured" also in-
cludes: 
e. any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in 
the Declarations but only with respect 
to Coverages A, B, E and F and only for 
the "residence premises". 
5. "insured location" means: 
a. the "residence premises"; 
b. the part of other premises, other struc-
tures and grounds used by you as a resi-
dence and: 
(1) which is shown in the Declarations 
as an ADDITIONAL RESIDENCE; or 
(2) which is acquired by you during the 
policy period for your use as a resi-
dence; 
c. any premises used by you in connection 
with a premises in 5.a. or 5.b. above; 
d. any part of a premises: 
(1) not owned by an "insured"; and 
(2) where an "insured" is temporarily 
residing,-
e. vacant land, other than farm land, 
owned by or rented to an "insured"; 
f. land owned by or rented to an "insured" 
on which a one or two family dwelling is 
being built as a residence for an "in-
sured"; 
g. individual or family cemetery plots or 
burial vaults of an "insured"; 
h. any part of a premises occasionally 
rented to an "insured" for other than 
"business" use; or 
i. any premises owned by you and rented 
to others for use as a residence by not 
more than two families if shown in the 
Declarations as a ONE OR TWO FAMILY 
DWELLING RENTED TO OTHERS. 
6. "occurrence" means an accident, includ-
ing continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful 
conditions, which results, during the policy 
period, in: 
a. "bodily injury"; or 
b. "property damage". 
7. "personal injury" means injury arising 
out of one or more of the following of-
fenses: 
a. false arrest, detention or imprisonment, 
or malicious prosecution; 
b. libel, slander or defamation of charac-
ter; or 
c. invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction 
or wrongful entry. 
8. "property damage" means physical injury 
to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible 
property. 
9. "residence employee" means: 
a. an employee of an "insured" whose du-
ties are related to the maintenance or 
use of the "residence premises", includ-
ing household or domestic services; or 
b. one who performs similar duties else-
where not related to the "business" of 
an "insured". 
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10. "residence premises" medns: 
a. the one family dwelling, other struc-
tures, and grounds; or 
b. that part of any other building; 
where you reside and which is shown as 
the "residence premises" in the Declara-
tions. 
"Residence premises" also means a two 
family dwelling where you reside in at 
least one of the family units and which is 
shown as the RESIDENCE PREMISES in 
the Declarations. 
SECTION I—PROPERTY COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A—DWELLING 
We cover: 
1. the dwelling on the "residence premises" 
shown in the Declarations, including struc-
tures attached to the dwelling; and 
2. materials and supplies located on or next 
to the "residence premises" used to con-
struct, alter or repair the dwelling or other 
structures on the "residence premises". 
This coverage does not apply to land, including 
land on which the dwelling is located, except as 
provided under Additional Coverage 11. Land. 
COVERAGE B—OTHER STRUCTURES 
We cover other structures on the "residence 
premises" set apart from the dwelling by clear 
space. This includes structures connected to the 
dwelling by only a fence, utility line, or similar 
connection. 
This coverage does not apply to land, including 
land on which the other structures are located, 
except as provided under Additional Coverage 
11. Land. 
We do not cover other structures: 
1. used in whole or in part for "business". 
This does not include the incidental and 
temporary storage of "business" property; 
2. rented or held for rental to any person not 
a tenant of the dwelling, unless used solely 
as a private residence or private garage. 
The limit of liability for this coverage will not be 
more than 10% of the limit of liability that ap-
plies to Coverage A, unless an amount is shown 
in the Declarations for Coverage B. Use of this 
coverage does not reduce the Coverage A limit of 
liability. 
COVERAGE C—PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We cover personal property owned or used by an 
"insured" while it is anywhere in the world. At 
your request, we will cover personal property 
owned by: 
1. others while the property is on the part of 
the "residence premises" occupied by an 
"insured"; 
2. a guest or a "residence employee", while 
the property is in any residence occupied 
by an "insured". 
Our limit of liability for personal property usu-
ally located at an "insured's" residence, other 
than the "residence premises", is 10% of the limit 
of liability for Coverage C, or $1,000, whichever 
is greater. Personal property in a newly acquired 
principal residence is not subject to this limita-
tion. 
Special Limits of Liability- These limits do not in-
crease the Coverage C limit of liability. The spe-
cial limit for each numbered category below is 
the total limit for each loss for all property in 
that category. 
1. $1,000 on money, bank notes, bullion, gold 
other than goldware, silver other than 
silverware, platinum, coins and medals. 
2. $5,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evi-
dences of debt, letters of credit, notes 
other than bank notes, manuscripts, per-
sonal records, passports, tickets and 
stamps. This dollar limit applies to these 
categories regardless of the medium (such 
as paper or computer software) on which 
the material exists. 
However, when this property is located in 
an off premises commercial or bank vault 
or safety deposit box this special limit of 
liability does not apply. 
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This limit includes the cost to research, re-
place or restore the information from the 
lost or damaged material. 
3. $2,500 on watercraft, including their trail-
ers, furnishings, equipment and outboard 
motors. 
4. $3,000 on trailers not used with water-
craft. 
5. $5,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or los-
ing of jewelry, watches, furs, precious and 
semi-precious stones. 
6. $6,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or los-
ing of firearms. 
7. $10,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or los-
ing of silverware, silver-plated ware, 
goldware, gold-plated ware and 
pewterware. This includes flatware, hol-
lowware, tea sets, trays and trophies made 
of or including silver, gold or pewter. 
8. $10,000 on property, on the "residence 
premises", used at any time or in any man-
ner for any "business" purpose. 
9. $1,000 on property, away from the "resi-
dence premises", used at any time or in 
any manner for any "business" purpose. 
Property Not Covered. We do not cover: 
1. articles separately described and specifi-
cally insured in this or other insurance ex-
cept as provided in Coverage Y, if applica-
ble; 
2. animals, birds or fish; 
3. motor vehicles or all other motorized land 
conveyances. This includes the following 
while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance: 
a. equipment and accessories; or 
b. radio receivers, transmitters, transceiv-
ers, telephones, tape decks, or other 
similar electronic equipment, if de-
signed to operate from the electrical 
system of the vehicle or conveyance. 
This includes accessories, antennas, 
tapes, wires or discs for use with such 
equipment. 
We do cover vehicles or conveyances not 
subject to motor vehicle registration which 
are: 
a. used to service an "insured's" resi-
dence; or 
b. designed for assisting the handicapped; 
4. aircraft and parts. Aircraft means any con-
trivance used or designed for flight, except 
model or hobby aircraft not used or de-
signed to carry people or cargo; 
5. property of roomers, boarders and other 
tenants, except property of roomers and 
boarders related to an "insured"; 
6. property in an apartment regularly rented 
or held for rental to others by an "in-
sured"; 
7. property rented or held for rental to others 
off the "residence premises"; 
8. "business" data, including such data 
stored in: 
o.. books of account, drawings or other pa-
per records; or 
b. electronic data processing tapes, wires, 
records, discs or other software media. 
However, we do cover the cost of blank re-
cording or storage media, and of pre-re-
corded computer programs available on 
the retail market. 
9. credit cards or fund transfer cards except 
as provided in Additional Coverage 6. 
10. We do not cover food in a refrigerator or 
freezer except as provided in Additional 
Coverage 13. 
COVERAGE D—LOSS OF USE 
1. If a loss covered under Section I makes 
that part of the "residence premises" 
where you reside not fit to live in, we 
cover, at your choice, either of the follow-
ing. However, if the "residence premises" 
is not your principal place of residence, we 
will not provide the option under para-
graph b. below. 
a. Additional Living Expense, meaning 
any necessary increase in living ex-
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penses incurred4by you so that your 
household can maintain its normal stan-
dard of living; or 
b. Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair 
rental value of that part of the "resi-
dence premises" where you reside less 
any expenses that do not continue while 
the premises is not fit to live in. 
Payment under a. or b. will be for the 
shortest time required to repair or replace 
the damage or, if you permanently relo-
cate, the shortest time required for your 
household to settle elsewhere. 
2. If a loss covered under Section I makes 
that part of the "residence premises" 
rented to others or held for rental by you 
not fit to live in, we cover the: 
Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair 
rental value of that part of the "resi-
dence premises" rented to others or held 
for rental by you less any expenses that 
do not continue while the premises is 
not fit to live in. 
Payment will be for the shortest time re-
quired to repair or replace that part of the 
premises rented or held for rental. 
3. If a civil authority prohibits you from use 
of the "residence premises" as a result of 
direct damage to neighboring premises by 
a Peril Insured Against in this policy, fre 
cover the Additional Living Expense or 
Fair Rental Value loss provided under 1 
and 2 above for no more than 30 days. 
The periods of time under 1, 2 and 3 above are 
not limited by expiration of this policy. 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancella-
tion of a lease or agreement. 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
1. Debris Removal. We will pay your reasonable 
expense for the removal of: 
a. debris of covered property if a Peril In-
sured Against that applies to the dam-
aged property causes the loss; or 
b. ash, dust or particles from a volcanic 
eruption that has caused direct loss to a 
building or property contained in a build-
ing. 
We will also pay your reasonable expense 
for the removal from the "residence prem-
ises" of: 
a. your tree felled by the peril of Windstorm 
or Hail; 
b. your tree felled by the peril of Weight of 
Ice, Snow or Sleet; or 
c. a neighbor's tree felled by a Peril Insured 
Against under Coverage C, 
provided the tree damages a covered struc-
ture. 
2. Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reason-
able cost incurred by you for necessary re-
pairs made solely to protect covered prop-
erty from further damage if a Peril Insured 
Against causes the loss. This coverage does 
not increase the limit of liability that applies 
to the property being repaired. 
3. Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover 
trees, shrubs, plants or lawns on the "resi-
dence premises", for loss caused by the fol-
lowing Perils Insured Against: Fire or light-
ning, Explosion, Riot or civil commotion, 
Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or operated by 
a resident of the "residence premises", Van-
dalism or malicious mischief or Theft. 
The limit of liability for this coverage will 
not be more than 5% of the limit of liability 
that applies to the dwelling or more than 
$1,000 for any one tree, shrub or plant. We 
do not cover property grown for "business" 
purposes. 
This coverage is additional insurance. 
4. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay 
up to $1,000 for your liability assumed by 
contract or agreement for fire department 
charges incurred when the fire department is 
called to save or protect covered property 
from a Peril Insured Against. 
This coverage is additional insurance. No de-
ductible applies to this coverage. 
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5. Property Removed. Wfc insure covered prop-
erty against direct loss from any cause while 
being removed from a premises endangered 
by a Peril Insured Against and for no more 
than 90 days while removed. This coverage 
does not change the limit of liability that ap-
plies to the property being removed. 
6. Credit Cards, Fund Transfer Cards, Forgery 
and Counterfeit Money. 
a. We will pay for loss to an "insured": 
(1) resulting from theft or unauthorized 
use of credit cards issued to or regis-
tered in an "insured's" name; 
(2) resulting from theft or unauthorized 
use of fund transfer cards used for 
deposit, withdrawal or transfer of 
funds, issued to or registered to an 
"insured's" name; 
(3) resulting from forgery or alteration 
of any check or negotiable instru-
ment; and 
(4) resulting from acceptance in good 
faith of counterfeit United States or 
Canadian paper currency. 
b. The most we will pay is $10,000 for all 
loss made possible by one event, regard-
less of the number of cards, checks, bills, 
instruments or transactions involved. Un-
der this coverage, "event" means: 
(1) a single theft or loss of any number of 
credit cards, fund transfer cards, 
checks or negotiable instruments; 
(2) the acceptance of all counterfeit 
money from any one person; and 
(3) the acquisition of an "insured's" ac-
count number or identification code 
by another person. 
c. We do not cover use of credit cards or 
fund transfer cards: 
(1) by a resident of your household; 
(2) by a person who has been entrusted 
with either type of card; or 
(3) if an "insured" has not complied with 
all terms and conditions under which 
the cards are issued. 
d. We do not cover loss arising out of "busi-
ness" use or dishonesty of an "insured". 
e. This coverage is additional insurance. No 
deductible applies to this coverage. 
f. We will defend any lawsuit brought 
against an "insured" for the losses de-
scribed in 6.a.(l), 6.a.(2) and 6.a.(3) 
above. We may investigate or settle any 
claim or lawsuit. Our obligation to pay or 
defend ends when the applicable limit of 
liability is used up by the payment of 
judgments or settlements. 
7. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $10,000 
for your share of any loss assessment 
charged during the policy period against you 
by a corporation or association of property 
owners. This only applies when the assess-
ment is made as a result of each direct loss 
to the property, owned by all members col-
lectively, caused by a Peril Insured Against 
under Coverage A—Dwelling. We do not 
cover earthquake or land shock waves or 
tremors before, during or after a volcanic 
eruption unless Coverage O—Earthquake 
applies. 
This coverage applies only to loss assess-
ments charged against you as owner or ten-
ant of the "residence premises". 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
against you or a corporation or association 
of property owners by any governmental 
body. 
8. Landlord's Furnishings. We cover your prop-
erty in an apartment on the "residence 
premises" which you rent or hold for rental 
to others. Coverage is limited to household 
furnishings. We insure for direct physical 
loss to this property caused by a Peril In-
sured Against under Coverage C, except 
theft. 
Our limit of liability for this coverage is 
$10,000. 
9. Inflation Coverage. The limit of liability 
shown in the Declarations for Coverage A— 
Dwelling, will be adjusted at the time of loss 
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to reflect any increase in the cost of con-
struction as reported to us by a recognized 
appraisal company. Corresponding adjust-
ments will also be made in the limits of lia-
bility for Coverages B, C and D. In no event 
will these adjustments result in limits less 
than those shown in the Declarations for 
these coverages. 
The amount of increase will be calculated 
from the effective date of the policy period 
shown in the Declarations to the date of the 
loss. If the limit of liability for Coverage A is 
changed at your request during the policy 
period, we will use the effective date of 
change in place of the effective date of the 
policy to calculate the increase. 
10. Building Additions and Alterations. We cover 
additions, alterations and improvements, 
made or acquired at the "insured's" ex-
pense, to that part of a building which is 
rented to the "insured" as a residence. We 
insure for direct physical loss to this prop-
erty caused by a Peril Insured Against. Our 
limit of liability for this coverage is $1,000. 
11. Land. Whenever there is a covered loss to 
your dwelling or other permanent structure 
and the related repair or rebuilding requires 
excavation, replacement, or stabilization of 
land under or around your dwelling or other 
permanent structure, we will also pay up to 
10% of the amount of the covered loss to 
your dwelling or other permanent structure 
for the excavation, replacement, or stabiliza-
tion of the land. 
12. Collapse. We insure for direct physical loss 
to covered property involving collapse of a 
building or any part of a building caused 
only by one or more of the following: 
a. Perils Insured Against in Coverage A and 
B; 
b. hidden decay; 
c. hidden insect or vermin damage; 
d. weight of contents, equipment, animals or 
people; 
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof; or 
f. use of defective material or methods in 
construction, remodeling or renovation if 
the collapse occurs during the course of 
the construction, remodeling or renova-
tion. 
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, 
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue, 
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, re-
taining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock is 
not included under items b., c , d., e. and f. 
unless the loss is a direct result of the col-
lapse of a building. 
Collapse does not include settling, cracking, 
shrinking, bulging or expansion. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of 
liability applying to the damaged covered 
property. 
This additional coverage does not apply to 
Coverage C—Personal Property. 
13. Refrigerated Food Spoilage. We cover food 
in a refrigerator or freezer on the "residence 
premises" for direct physical loss caused by 
a change in temperature due to: 
a. Interruption of electrical power to the re-
frigeration equipment; or 
b. mechanical breakdown or electrical fail-
ure of the refrigeration unit. 
The most we will pay is $1,000. We will pay 
only the part of the loss that exceeds $50. 
Any other loss to refrigerated food caused 
by a Peril Insured Against is covered up to 
the limit of Coverage C of the policy. The 
policy deductible will apply. 
14. Lock Replacement. We will pay up to $500 
for the reasonable costs incurred by you to 
replace the locks at the "residence prem-
ises" when your keys to the "residence 
premises" have been lost or stolen. No de-
ductible applies to this coverage. 
15. Reward Coverage. We will pay up to $1,000 
for the payment of rewards you have in-
curred for information leading to the return 
of stolen articles or the arrest and conviction 
of any person(s) who have stolen articles or 
damaged any of your covered property. 
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16. Data Replacement We will pay up to $5,000 
to recreate personal records or data stored 
on a tape, record, disc or other media de-
signed for use with a computer on the "resi-
dence premises''. 
LOSS DEDUCTIBLE 
In case of a loss covered under Section I, we will 
pay only the part of the loss over the applicable 
deductible amount stated in the Declarations. 
However, if the amount of the covered loss is 
equal to or greater than $50,000 we will waive 
the first $500 of any deductible. 
SECTION I—PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
We insure the property described in Coverages A, 
B and C against risks of direct physical loss, sub-
ject to the following Exclusions, the Section I— 
General Exclusions, and other provisions of this 
policy. 
1. Coverage A, Coverage B and Coverage C 
Exclusions 
We do not cover loss caused by: 
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air con-
ditioning or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system or of a household appli-
ance, or by discharge, leakage or over-
flow from within the system or appliance 
caused by freezing. This exclusion ap-
plies only while the dwelling is vacant, 
unoccupied or being constructed, unless 
you have used reasonable care to: 
(1) maintain heat in the building; or 
(2) shut off the water supply and drain 
the system and appliances of water; 
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of 
water or ice, whether driven by wind or 
not, to a: 
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming 
pool; 
(2) foundation, retaining wail or bulk-
head; or 
(3) pier, wharf or dock; 
c. theft in or to a dwelling under construc-
tion, or of materials and supplies for use 
m the construction until the dwelling is 
finished and occupied; 
d. (1) wear and tear, marring, deteriora-
tion; 
(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechani-
cal breakdown; 
(3) smog, rust, mold, wet or dry rot; 
(4) smoke from agricultural smudging or 
industrial operations; 
(5) release, discharge or dispersal of 
contaminants or pollutants; 
(6) settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging 
or expansion of pavements, patios, 
foundations, walls, floors, roofs or 
ceilings; or 
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or do-
mestic animals. 
If any of these cause water damage not oth-
erwise excluded, from a plumbing, heating, 
air conditioning or automatic fire protec-
tive sprinkler system or household appli-
ance, we cover loss caused by the water in-
cluding the cost of tearing out and replac-
ing any part of a building or grounds 
necessary to repair the system or appli-
ance. 
We do not cover loss to the system or appli-
ance from which this water escaped. 
Under items a. through d., any ensuing loss to 
property described in Coverages A, B and C 
not excluded or excepted in this policy is cov-
ered. 
2. Coverage A and Coverage B Exclusions 
We do not cover loss: 
a. caused by vandalism and malicious mis-
chief or breakage of glass and safety 
glazing materials if the dwelling has been 
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days 
immediately before the loss. A dwelling 
being constructed is not considered va-
cant. 
b. involving collapse, other than as pro-
vided in Additional Coverage 12. How-
ever, any ensuing loss to property de-
scribed in Coverages A and B not ex-
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eluded or excepted in this policy is 
covered. 
3. Coverage C Exclusions 
We do not cover loss caused by: 
a. breakage of: 
(1) eyeglasses, glassware, statuary, mar-
ble; 
(2) bric-a-brac, porcelains and similar 
fragile articles other than jewelry, 
watches, bronzes, cameras and pho-
tographic lenses. 
There is coverage for breakage of the 
property by or resulting from: 
(1) fire, lightning, windstorm, hail; 
(2) smoke, other than smoke from agri-
cultural smudging or industrial oper-
ations; 
(3) explosion, riot, civil commotion; 
(4) aircraft, vehicles, vandalism and ma-
licious mischief, earthquake, or vol-
canic eruption; 
(5) collapse of a building or any part of a 
building; 
(6) water not otherwise excluded; 
(7) theft or attempted theft; or 
(8) sudden and accidental tearing apart, 
cracking, burning or bulging of: 
(a) a steam or hot water heating sys-
tem; 
(b) an air conditioning or automatic 
fire protective sprinkler system; 
or 
(c) an appliance for heating water; 
b. dampness of atmosphere or extremes of 
temperature unless the direct cause of 
loss is rain, snow, sleet or hail; 
c. refinishing, renovating or repairing prop-
erty other than watches, jewelry and 
furs; 
d. collision, other than collision with a land 
vehicle, sinking, swamping or stranding 
of watercraft, including their trailers, 
furnishings, equipment and outboard mo-
tors; 
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e destruction, contiscation or seizure by or-
der of any government or public author-
ity; or 
f. acts or decisions, including the failure to 
act or decide, of any person, group, orga-
nization or governmental body. However, 
any ensuing loss to property described in 
Coverage C not excluded or excepted in 
this policy is covered. 
SECTION I—GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 
1 These additional exclusions apply to Cover-
ages A, B and C. We do not insure for loss 
caused directly or indirectly by any of the 
following, regardless of any other cause or 
event contributing concurrently or in any se-
quence to the loss: 
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of 
any ordinance or law regulating the con-
struction, repair, or demolition of a build-
ing or other structure, except as provided 
under Loss Settlement in Section I—Con-
ditions. 
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake in-
cluding land shock waves or tremors 
before, during or after a volcanic erup-
tion; landslide; mudflow; earth sinking, 
rising or shifting; unless direct loss by: 
(1) fire or explosion; 
(2) theft; or 
(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing 
material which is part of a building, 
storm door or storm window; 
ensues and then we will pay only for the 
ensuing loss. 
This exclusion applies only to property 
described in Coverages A and B. 
c. Water Damage, meaning: 
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal 
water, overflow of a body of water, or 
spray from any of these, whether or 
not driven by wind; 
(2) water below the surface of the 
ground, including water which exerts 
pressure on or seeps or leaks through 
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a building, sidewalk, driveway, tounT 
dation, swimming pool or other struc* 
ture. 
Direct loss by fire, explosion or theft re-
sulting from water damage is covered. 
Water damage indirectly caused by fire, 
vehicles, aircraft or vandalism or mali-
cious mischief is also covered. 
Paragraphs (1) and (3) of this exclusion 
do not apply to any insured direct physi-
cal loss by water from any plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning or automatic fire 
protective sprinkler system on the "resi-
dence premises". 
Water damage to property described in 
Coverage C away from a premises or loca-
tion owned, rented, occupied or controlled 
by an "insured" is covered. 
Water damage to property described in 
Coverage C on a premises or location 
owned, rented, occupied or controlled by 
an "insured" is excluded even if weather 
conditions contribute in any way to pro-
duce the loss. 
d. Neglect, meaning neglect of the "insured" 
to use all reasonable means to save and 
preserve property at and after the time of 
a loss. 
e. War, including undeclared war, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, war-
like act by a military force or military per-
sonnel, destruction or seizure or use for a 
military purpose, and including any con-
sequence of any of these. Discharge of a 
nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike 
act even if accidental. 
f. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in 
the Nuclear Hazard Clause of Section I— 
Conditions. 
g. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising 
out of any act committed: 
(1) by or at the direction of an "insured"; 
and 
(2) with the intent to cause a loss. 
2. We do not insure for loss to property de-
scribed in Coverages A and B caused by any 
of the following. However, any ensuing loss 
to property described in Coverages A and B 
not excluded or excepted in this policy is 
covered. 
a. Weather Conditions. However, this exclu-
sion only applies if weather conditions 
contribute in any way with a cause or 
event excluded in paragraph 1. above to 
produce the loss; 
b. Acts or Decisions, including the failure to 
act or decide, of any person, group, orga-
nization or governmental body; 
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective: 
(1) planning, zoning, development, sur-
veying, siting; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, 
repair, construction, renovation, re-
modeling, grading, compaction; 
(3) materials used in repair, construction, 
renovation or remodeling; or 
(4) maintenance; 
of part or all of any property whether on 
or off the "residence premises". 
SECTION I—CONDITIONS 
1. Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. Even 
if more than one person has an insurable in-
terest in the property covered, we will not 
be liable in any one loss to the "insured" for 
more than the amount of the "insured's" in-
terest at the time of loss. However, the most 
we will pay is the applicable limit of liabil-
ity. 
2. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to 
covered property, you must see that the fol-
lowing are done: 
a. give prompt notice to us. You may phone 
our Instant Claim Service or contact your 
agent; 
b. notify the police in case of loss by theft; 
c. notify the credit card or fund transfer 
card companies in case of loss under 
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Credit Cards or Fund Transfer Cards cov-
erage; 
d. (1) protect the property from further 
loss; 
(2) make reasonable and necessary re-
pairs to protect the property; and 
(3) keep an accurate record of repair ex-
penses; 
e. prepare a detailed inventory of personal 
property claimed. The inventory must in-
clude a description of the property, quan-
tity, replacement cost, amount of depreci-
ation and amount of loss. Attach all bills, 
receipts and related papers that support 
your inventory; 
f. as often as we reasonably require: 
(1) show the damaged property; 
(2) provide us with records and docu-
ments we request and permit us to 
make copies; and 
(3) submit to examination under oath; 
g. send to us, within 60 days after our re-
quest, your signed, sworn proof of loss 
which sets forth, to the best of your 
knowledge and belief: 
(1) the time and cause of loss; 
(2) the interest of the "insured" and all 
others in the property involved and 
all liens on the property; 
(3) other insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4) changes in title or occupancy of the 
property during the term of the pol-
icy; 
(5) specifications of damaged buildings 
and detailed repair estimates; 
(6) the inventory of personal property 
described in 2.e. above; 
(7) receipts for additional living ex-
penses incurred and records that sup-
port the fair rental value loss; and 
(8) evidence or affidavit that supports a 
claim under the Credit Cards, Fund 
Transfer Cards, Forgery and Counter-
feit' Money coverage, stating the 
amount and cause of loss. 
3. Loss Settlement. Covered property losses 
are settled as follows: 
a. (1) personal property; 
(2) awnings, carpeting, household appli-
ances, outdoor antennas and outdoor 
equipment, whether or not attached 
to buildings; and 
(3) structures that are not buildings; 
at the replacement cost at the time of 
loss. For articles separately described 
and specifically insured in this policy or a 
Personal Articles Policy issued to you by 
us, this settlement provision will be ex-
cess over the amount recoverable under 
such other insurance. 
We will pay no more than the least of the 
following amounts: 
a. replacement cost at the time of loss 
without deduction for depreciation; 
b. the full cost of repair at the time of 
loss; 
c. the limit of liability that applies to 
Coverage C; or 
d. any applicable special limits of lia-
bility stated in this policy. 
We will not pay more than the actual cost 
to repair or replace, less deduction for de-
preciation, at the time of loss for any of 
the following: 
a. antiques, fine arts, paintings and 
similar articles of rarity or antiq-
uity which cannot be replaced; 
b. memorabilia, souvenirs, collector's 
items and similar articles whose age 
or history contribute to their value; 
c. articles not maintained in good or 
workable condition; or 
d. articles that are outdated or obso-
lete and are stored or not being 
used. 
b. Buildings under Coverage A or Coverage 
B at replacement cost without deduction 
for depreciation. Replacement cost will 
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include any increased cost due to the en-
forcement of any ordinance or law that 
regulates the construction, repair or dem-
olition of the covered buildings. Loss set-
tlements under this paragraph are subject 
to the following: 
(1) we will pay the actual cost to repair 
or replace, without deduction for de-
preciation, but not more than the 
least of the following amounts: 
(a) the limit of liability under this 
policy that applies to the building; 
(b) the replacement cost of that part 
of the building damaged for like 
construction and use on the same 
premises; or 
(c) the necessary amount actually 
spent to repair or replace the 
damaged building; 
(2) we will pay no more than the replace-
ment cost of the damage, less deduc-
tion for depreciation, unless: 
(a) actual repair or replacement is 
complete; or 
(b) the cost to repair or replace the 
damage is less than $5,000. 
4. Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of loss to a pair 
or set we may elect to: 
a. repair or replace any part to restore the 
pair or set to its value before the loss; or 
b. pay the difference between the value of 
the property before and after the loss. 
5. Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass 
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be set-
tled on the basis of replacement with safety 
glazing materials when required by ordi-
nance or law. 
6. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the 
amount of loss, either may demand an ap-
praisal of the loss. In this event, each party 
will choose a competent appraiser within 20 
days after receiving a written request from 
the other. The two appraisers will choose an 
umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire 
within 15 days, you or we may request that 
the choice be made by a judge of a court of 
record in the state where the 4tresidence 
premises'' is located. The appraisers will 
separately set the amount of loss. If the ap-
praisers submit a written report of an agree-
ment to us, the amount agreed upon will be 
the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they 
will submit their differences to the umpire. A 
decision agreed to by any two will set the 
amount of loss. 
Each party will: 
a. pay its own appraiser; and 
b. bear the other expenses of the appraisal 
and umpire equally. 
7. Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this 
policy is also covered by other insurance, we 
will pay only the proportion of the loss that 
the limit of liability that applies under this 
policy bears to the total amount of insurance 
covering the loss. 
8. Suit Against Us. Legal action may not be 
brought against us under any coverage pro-
vided by this policy unless the "insured" has 
fully complied with all the terms of this pol-
icy. Legal action taken against us must begin 
within two years after the date of loss. 
9. Our Option. If we give you written notice 
within 30 days after we receive your signed, 
sworn proof of loss, we may repair or re-
place any part of the claimed property with 
like property. 
10. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with 
you. We will pay you unless some other per-
son is named in the policy or is legally enti-
tled to receive payment. Loss will be payable 
30 days after we receive your proof of loss 
and: 
a. reach an agreement with you; 
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or 
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award 
with us. 
11. Abandonment of Property. We need not ac-
cept any property abandoned by an "in-
sured". 
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12. Mortgage Clause. 
The word "mortgagee" includes trustee. 
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any 
loss payable under Coverage A or B will be 
paid to the mortgagee and you, as interests 
appear. If more than one mortgagee is 
named, the order of payment will be the 
same as the order of precedence of the mort-
gages. 
If we deny your claim, that denial will not 
apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee, if 
the mortgagee: 
a. notifies us of any change in ownership, 
occupancy or substantial change in risk 
of which the mortgagee is aware; 
b. pays any premium due under this policy 
on demand if you have neglected to pay 
the premium; and 
c. submits a signed, sworn statement of loss 
within 60 days after receiving notice 
from us of your failure to do so. Policy 
conditions relating to Appraisal, Suit 
Against Us and Loss Payment apply to 
the mortgagee. 
If the policy is cancelled or not renewed by 
us, the mortgagee will be notified at least 10 
days before the date cancellation or nonre-
newal takes effect. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and 
deny payment to you: 
a. we are subrogated to all the rights of the 
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on 
the property; or 
b. at our option, we may pay to the mortga-
gee the whole principal on the mortgage 
plus any accrued interest. In this event, 
we will receive a full assignment and 
transfer of the mortgage and all securi-
ties held as collateral to the mortgage 
debt. 
Subrogation will not impair the right of the 
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the 
mortgagee's claim. 
13. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize 
any assignment or grant any coverage that 
benefits a person or organization holding, 
storing or moving property for a fee regard-
less of any other provision of this policy. 
14. Nuclear Hazard Clause. 
a. "Nuclear Hazard" means any nuclear re-
action, radiation, or radioactive contami-
nation, all whether controlled or uncon-
trolled or however caused, or any conse-
quence of any of these. 
b. Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will 
not be considered loss caused by fire, ex-
plosion, or smoke, whether these perils 
are specifically named in or otherwise in-
cluded within the Perils Insured Against 
in Section I. 
c. This policy does not apply under Section I 
to loss caused directly or indirectly by 
nuclear hazard, except that direct loss by 
fire resulting from the nuclear hazard is 
covered. 
15. Recovered Property. If you or we recover 
any property for which we have made pay-
ment under this policy, you or we will notify 
the other of the recovery. At your option, 
the property will be returned to or retained 
by you or it will become our property. If the 
recovered property is returned to or re-
tained by you, the loss payment will be ad-
justed based on the amount you received for 
the recovered property. 
16. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more vol-
canic eruptions that occur within a 72-hour 
period will be considered as one volcanic 
eruption. 
17. Premises Security or Fire Protection System. 
(Applies only if PROTECTIVE DEVICES 
CREDIT APPLIED is shown in the Declara-
tions.) We acknowledge the installation and 
approval of a security or fire protection sys-
tem on the ''residence premises". You agree 
to maintain the system in working order and 
to notify us promptly of any change made to 
the system or if it is removed. 
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SECTION 11—LIABILITY COVERAGES 
COVERAGE E —PERSONAL LIABILITY 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an 
"insured" for damages because of "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage'1 caused by an "oc-
currence" to which this coverage applies, we 
will: 
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the dam-
ages for which the "insured" is legally lia-
ble. Damages include prejudgment interest 
awarded against the "insured"; and 
2. provide a defense at our expense by coun-
sel of our choice, even if the suit is ground-
less, false or fraudulent. We may investi-
gate and settle any claim or suit that we 
decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or 
defend ends when the amount we pay for 
damages resulting from the "occurrence" 
equals our limit of liability. 
COVERAGE F —MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO 
OTHERS 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that 
are incurred or medically ascertained withjn 
three years from the date of an accident causing 
"bodily injury". Medical expenses means reason-
able charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, 
ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, pros-
thetic devices and funeral services. This cover-
age does not apply to you or regular residents of 
your household except "residence employees". 
As to others, this coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the "insured location" with 
the permission of an "insured"; or 
2. to a person off the "insured location", if 
the "bodily injury": 
a. arises out of a condition on the "insured 
location" or the ways immediately ad-
joining; 
b. is caused by the activities of an "in-
sured"; 
c. is caused by a "residence employee" in 
the course of the "residence em-
ployee's" employment by an "insured"; 
or 
d. is caused by an animal owned by or in 
the care of an "insured". 
SECTION II—EXCLUSIONS 
1. Coverage E—Personal Liability and Cov-
erage F—Medical Payments to Others do 
not apply to "bodily injury" or "property 
damage": 
a. which is expected or intended by the "In-
sured"; 
b. arising out of "business" pursuits of an 
"insured" except those of a "clerical of-
fice employee"; or the rental or holding 
for rental of any part of any premises by 
an "insured". 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) activities which are usual to non-
business" pursuits; or 
(2) the rental or holding for rental of an 
"insured location": 
(a) on an occasional basis if used 
only as a residence; 
(b) in part for use only as a resi-
dence, unless a single family unit 
is intended for use by the occupy-
ing family to lodge more than two 
roomers or boarders; or 
(c) in part, as an office, school, studio 
or private garage; 
(3) the rental of other structures on the 
"residence premises" for use as a pri-
vate residence if the words IN-
CLUDES STRUCTURES RENTED TO 
OTHERS are shown in the Declara-
tions; 
c. arising out of the rendering of or failure 
to render professional services; 
d. arising out of a premises: 
(1) owned by an "insured"; 
(2) rented to an "insured"; or 
(3) rented to others by an "insured"; 
that is not an "insured location"; 
e. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of motor vehi-
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cles or all other motorized land con-
veyances, including trailers, owned 
or operated by or rented or loaned to 
an "insured1'; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a 
motor vehicle or any other motorized 
land conveyance to any person; or 
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether 
imposed by statute or otherwise, for, 
the actions of a child or minor using a 
conveyance excluded in paragraph 
(1) or (2) above. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) a trailer not towed by or carried on a 
motorized land conveyance; 
(2) a motorized land conveyance de-
signed for recreational use off public 
roads, not subject to motor vehicle 
registration and: 
(a) not owned by an "insured"; or 
(b) owned by an "insured" and on an 
"insured location"; 
(3) a motorized golf cart when used to 
play golf on a golf course; or 
(4) a vehicle or conveyance not subject to 
motor vehicle registration which is: 
(a) used to service an "insured's" 
residence; 
(b) designed for assisting the handi-
capped; or 
(c) in dead storage on an "insured lo-
cation"; 
f. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of a watercraft 
described below; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a 
watercraft described below to any 
person; or 
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether 
imposed by statute or otherwise, for 
the actions of a child or minor using a 
watercraft described below. 
Watercraft: 
(1) with inboard or inboard-outdnve mo-
tor power owned by an "insured"; 
(2) with inboard or inboard-outdnve mo-
tor power of more than 50 horse-
power rented to an "insured"; 
(3) that is a sailing vessel with or with-
out auxiliary power, 26 feet or more 
in length owned by or rented to an 
"insured"; or 
(4) powered by one or more outboard mo-
tors with more than 25 total horse-
power if the outboard motor is owned 
by an "insured". But, outboard mo-
tors of more than 25 total horsepower 
are covered for the policy period if• 
(a) you acquire them prior to the pol-
icy period and: 
(i) you declare them at policy in-
ception; or 
(ii) your intention to insure is re-
ported to us m writing within 
45 days after you acquire the 
outboard motors; 
(b) you acquire them during the pol-
icy period. 
This exclusion does not apply while the 
watercraft is stored, 
g. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of an aircraft; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of 
an aircraft to any person; or 
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether 
imposed by statute or otherwise, for 
the actions of a child or minor using 
an aircraft. 
An aircraft means any contnvance used 
or designed for flight, except model or 
hobby aircraft not used or designed to 
carry people or cargo; 
h. caused directly or indirectly by war, in-
cluding undeclared war, civil war, insur-
rection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act 
by a military force or military personnel, 
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destruction or seizure or use for a miii-. 
tary purpose, and including any conse-
quence of any of these. Discharge of a nu-
clear weapon will be deemed a warlike 
act even if accidental; 
i. which arises out of the transmission of a 
communicable disease by an "insured". 
Exclusions l.d., I.e., l.f. and l.g. do not ap-
ply to t4bodily injury" to a "residence em-
ployee" arising out of and in the course of 
the "residence employee's" employment by 
an "insured". 
2. Coverage E—Personal Liability, does not 
apply to: 
a. liability: 
(1) for your share of any loss assessment 
charged against all members of an as-
sociation, corporation or community 
of property owners; 
(2) under any contract or agreement. 
However, this exclusion does not ap-
ply to written contracts: 
(a) that directly relate to the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of an 
"insured location"; or 
(b) where the liability of others is as-
sumed by an "insured" prior to 
an "occurrence"; 
unless excluded in (1) above or else-
where in this policy; 
b. "property damage" to property owned by 
an "insured"; 
c. "property damage" to property rented to, 
occupied or used by or in the care of an 
"insured". This exclusion does not apply 
to "property damage" caused by fire, 
smoke, explosion or water; 
d. "bodily injury" to any person eligible to 
receive any benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided; 
by an "insured" under any: 
(1) workers' compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law; 
e. 44bodily injury" or "property damage" for 
which an "insured" under this policy: 
(1) is also an insured under a nuclear en-
ergy liability policy; or 
(2) would be an insured under that policy 
but for the exhaustion of its limits of 
liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is one is-
sued by: 
(1) American Nuclear Insurers; 
(2) Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Un-
derwriters; 
(3) Nuclear Insurance Association of 
Canada; 
or any of their successors; 
f. "bodily injury" to you or an "insured" 
within the meaning of part a. or b. of "in-
sured" as defined; or 
g. "bodily injury" to any employee arising 
out of or in the course of the employee's 
employment by any ADDITIONAL IN-
SURED named in the Declarations. 
3- Coverage F—Medical Payments to 
Others, does not apply to "bodily injury": 
a. to a "residence employee" if the "bodily 
injury": 
(1) occurs off the "insured location"; and 
(2) does not arise out of or in the course 
of the "residence employee's" em-
ployment by an "insured"; 
b. to any person eligible to receive benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided; 
under any: 
(1) workers' compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law; 
c. from any: 
(1) nuclear reaction; 
(2) nuclear radiation; or 
(3) radioactive contamination; 
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all whether controlled or uncontrolled or 
however caused; or 
(4) any consequence of any of these; or 
d. to any person, other than a "residence 
employee" of an "insured", regularly re* 
siding on any part of the "insured loca-
tion". 
Only the following exclusions apply to "personal 
injury". "Personal injury" does not apply to: 
1. liability assumed by the "insured" under 
any contract or agreement except any in-
demnity obligation assumed by the "in-
sured" under a written contract directly 
relating to the ownership, maintenance or 
use of the premises; 
2. injury caused by a violation of a penal law 
or ordinance committed by or with the 
knowledge or consent of an "insured"; 
3. injury sustained by any person as a result 
of an offense directly or indirectly related 
to the employment of this person by the 
"insured"; 
4. injury arising out of the "business" pur-
suits of an "insured"; or 
5. civic or public activities performed for pay 
by an "insured". 
SECTION II—ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
We cover the following in addition to the limits of 
liability: 
1. Claim Expenses. We pay: 
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed 
against an "insured" in any suit we de-
fend; 
b. premiums on bonds required in a suit we 
defend, but not for bond amounts more 
than the limit of liability for Coverage E. 
We need not apply for or furnish any 
bond; 
c. reasonable expenses incurred by an "in-
sured" at our request, including actual 
loss of earnings (but not loss of other in-
come) up to $250 per day, for assisting us 
in the investigation or defense of a claim 
or suit; 
d. interest on the entire judgment which ac-
crues after entry of the judgment and 
before we pay or tender, or deposit in 
court that part of the judgment which 
does not exceed the limit of liability that 
applies. 
2. First Aid Expenses, We will pay expenses for 
first aid to others incurred by an "insured" 
for "bodily injury" covered under this pol-
icy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any 
other "insured". 
3. Damage to Property of Others. We will pay, 
at replacement cost, up to $1,000 per "occur-
rence" for "property damage" to property 
of others caused by an "insured". 
We will not pay for "property damage": 
a. to the extent of any amount recoverable 
under Section I of this policy; 
b. caused intentionally by an "insured" who 
is 13 years of age or older; 
c. to property owned by an "insured"; 
d. to property owned by or rented to a ten-
ant of an "insured" or a resident in your 
household; or 
e. arising out of: 
(1) "business" pursuits; 
(2) any act or omission in connection 
with a premises owned, rented or con-
trolled by an "insured", other than 
the "insured location"; or 
(3) the ownership, maintenance, or use 
of aircraft, watercraft or motor vehi-
cles or all other motorized land con-
veyances. 
This exclusion does not apply to a 
motorized land conveyance designed 
for recreational use off public roads, 
not subject to motor vehicle registra-
tion and not owned by an "insured". 
4. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $10,000 
for your share of any loss assessment 
charged during the policy period against you 
by a corporation or association of property 
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owners, when the assessment is made as a 
result of: 
a. each "occurrence" to which Section II of 
this policy would apply; 
b. liability for each act of a director, officer 
or trustee in the capacity as a director, 
officer or trustee, provided: 
(1) the director, officer or trustee is 
elected by the members of a corpora-
tion or association of property own-
ers; and 
(2) the director, officer or trustee serves 
without deriving any income from the 
exercise of duties which are solely on 
behalf of a corporation or association 
of property owners. 
This coverage applies only to loss assess-
ments charged against you as owner or ten-
ant of the 4tresidence premises". 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
against you or a corporation or association 
of property owners by any governmental 
body. 
Section II—Coverage E—Personal Liability 
Exclusion 2.a.(l) does not apply to this cov-
erage. 
SECTION II—CONDITIONS 
1. Limit of Liability. Our total liability under 
Coverage E for all damages resulting from 
any one "occurrence" will not be more than 
the limit of liability for Coverage E as shown 
in the Declarations. This limit is the same 
regardless of the number of "insureds", 
claims made or persons injured. 
All "bodily injury" and "property damage" 
resulting from any one accident or from con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same general harmful conditions 
shall be considered to be the result of one 
"occurrence". 
Our total liability under Coverage F for all 
medical expense payable for "bodily injury" 
to one person as the result of one accident 
will not be more than the limit of liability for 
Coverage F as shown in the Declarations. 
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2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance ap-
plies separately to each "insured". This con-
dition will not increase our limit of liability 
for any one "occurrence". 
3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or 
"occurrence", the "insured" will perform 
the following duties that apply. You will help 
us by seeing that these duties are performed: 
a. give written notice to us or our agent as 
soon as is practical, which sets forth: 
(1) the identity of the policy and "in-
sured"; 
(2) reasonably available information on 
the time, place and circumstances of 
the accident or "occurrence"; and 
(3) names and addresses of any claim-
ants and witnesses; 
b. promptly forward to us every notice, de-
mand, summons or other process relating 
to the accident or "occurrence"; 
c. at our request, help us: 
(1) to make settlement; 
(2) to enforce any right of contribution 
or indemnity against any person or 
organization who may be liable to an 
"insured"; 
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend 
hearings and trials; and 
(4) to secure and give evidence and ob-
tain the attendance of witnesses; 
d. under the coverage—Damage to Property 
-of Others—submit to us within 60 days 
after the loss, a sworn statement of loss 
and show the damaged property, if in the 
"insured's" control; 
e. the "insured" will not, except at the "in-
sured's" own cost, voluntarily make pay-
ment, assume obligation or incur expense 
other than for first aid to others at the 
time of the "bodily injury". 
4. Duties of an Injured Person—Coverage F— 
Medical Payments to Others. The injured 
person or someone acting for the injured 
person will: 
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a. give us written proof of claim, under oath 
if required, as soon as is practical; and 
b. authorize us to obtain copies of medical 
reports and records. 
The injured person will submit to a physical 
exam by a doctor of our choice when and as 
often as we reasonably require. 
5. Payment of Claim—Coverage F—Medical 
Payments to Others. Payment under this 
coverage is not an admission of liability by 
an "insured" or us. 
6. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought 
against us unless there has been compliance 
with the policy provisions. 
No one will have the right to join us as a 
party to any action against an "insured". 
Also, no action with respect to Coverage E 
can be brought against us until the obliga-
tion of the "insured" has been determined 
by final judgment or agreement signed by us. 
7. Bankruptcy of an Insured. Bankruptcy or in-
solvency of an "insured" will not relieve us 
of our obligations under this policy. 
8. Other Insurance—Coverage E—Personal Li-
ability. This insurance is excess over other 
valid and collectible insurance except insur-
ance written specifically to cover as excess 
over the limits of liability that apply in this 
policy. 
SECTIONS I AND II—CONDITIONS 
1. POLICY PERIOD. This policy applies only to 
loss in Section I or "bodily injury" or "prop-
erty damage" in Section II, which occurs 
during the policy period shown in the Decla-
rations. That policy period, and each succes-
sive period, begins and ends at 12:01 a.m. 
standard time, at the "residence premises". 
2. PREMIUM. The premium shown in the Decla-
rations is the premium for the policy period 
shown. If we elect to continue this insur-
ance, we will renew this policy if you pay 
the required renewal premium for the suc-
cessive policy period, subject to our premi-
ums, rules and forms then in effect. You must 
pay us prior to the end of the current policy 
period or else this policy will not continue. 
3. CONCEALMENT OR FRAUD. The entire policy 
will be void if, whether before or after a 
loss, an "insured" has: 
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented 
any material fact or circumstance; 
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 
c. made false statements; 
relating to this insurance. 
4. LIBERALIZATION CLAUSE. If we change any 
part of this policy to broaden coverage with-
out charge, your policy will be interpreted to 
provide this broadened coverage. The broad-
ened coverage will begin on the date that the 
change is effective in your state. 
5. WAIVER OR CHANGE OF POLICY PROVI-
SIONS. A waiver or change of a provision of 
this policy must be in writing by us to be 
valid. Our request for an appraisal or exami-
nation will not waive any of our rights. 
6. STATE STATUTES. The terms of this policy 
that are in conflict with the statutes of the 
state in which this policy is issued, are 
hereby amended to conform to those stat-
utes. 
7. CANCELLATION. 
a. The named insured shown in the Declara-
tions may cancel this policy at any time 
by returning it to us or by letting us know 
in writing of the date cancellation is to 
take effect. 
b. We may cancel this policy only for the 
reasons stated below by letting the 
named insured know in writing of the 
date cancellation takes effect. This can-
cellation notice will be mailed to the 
named insured at the mailing address last 
shown in the Declarations. 
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Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of 
notice. Delivery of this notice will be 
deemed the same as mailing. The effective 
date and time of cancellation stated in the 
notice will become the end of the policy 
period. 
(1) When the named insured has not paid 
the premium, we may cancel at any 
time by letting the named insured 
know at least 10 days before the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
(2) When this policy has been in effect 
for less than 60 days and is not a re-
newal with us, we may cancel for any 
reason by letting the named insured 
know at least 10 days before the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
(3) When this policy has been in effect 
for 60 days or more, or at any time if 
it is a renewal with us, we may can-
cel: 
(a) if there has been a material misrep-
resentation of fact which if known 
to us would have caused us not to 
issue the policy; or 
(b) if the risk has changed substantially 
since the policy was issued. 
This can be done by letting the named 
insured know at least 30 days before 
the date cancellation takes effect. 
c. When this policy is cancelled, the pre-
mium for the period from the date of can-
cellation to the expiration date will be re-
funded pro rata. 
d. If the return premium is not refunded 
with the notice of cancellation or when 
this policy is returned to us, we will re-
fund it within a reasonable time after the 
date cancellation takes effect. 
e. If this policy is cancelled by us, any AD-
DITIONAL INSURED named in the Decla-
rations will be notified in writing. 
8. NON-RENEWAL 
a. We may elect not to renew this policy. We 
may do so by mailing to the named in-
38 
sured at the mailing address last shown 
in the Declarations, written notice at 
least 45 days before the expiration date 
of this policy. Proof of mailing will be suf-
ficient proof of notice. Delivery of this no-
tice will be deemed the same as mailing. 
b. If this policy is not renewed by us, any 
ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the 
Declarations will be notified m writing. 
c. This policy will terminate without notice 
at the end of any policy period for failure 
to pay any premium when due. 
9. ASSIGNMENT. Assignment of this policy will 
not be valid unless we give our written con-
sent. 
10. SUBROGATION. An "insured" may waive in 
writing before a loss all rights of recovery 
against any person. If they are not so 
waived, we may require an assignment of 
rights of recovery for a loss to the extent 
that payment is made by us. 
If an assignment is sought, an "insured" 
must sign and deliver all related papers and 
cooperate with us. 
Subrogation does not apply under Section II 
to Medical Payments to Others or Damage to 
Property of Others. 
11. DEATH OF NAMED INSURED. If you die, we 
will insure your legal representative but 
only with respect to your premises and prop-
erty covered under this policy at the time of 
your death. 
The definition of "insured" will also include 
any person having temporary custody of 
your property until the appointment of a le-
gal representative. 
OPTIONAL ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
This section of your policy contains additional 
coverage options that you may select. None ap-
ply, however, unless specifically selected by you. 
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The coverages you have selected are listed in the 
COVERAGES section in the Declarations. 
COVERAGE G —MONEY 
The Special Limit of Liability No. 1 under Cover-
age C—Personal Property is increased. The re-
vised limit for No. 1 is shown in the Declarations. 
COVERAGE H—REPLACEMENT COST 
PROTECTION 
We agree to amend present coverage amounts in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
1. If you have: 
a. allowed us to adjust the Coverage A limit of 
liability and the premium in accordance 
with: 
(1) any property evaluations we make; and 
(2) any increases in the cost of construc-
tion as reported to us by a recognized 
appraisal company; and 
b. notified us, within 30 days of completion, 
of any alterations to the dwelling which in-
crease the replacement cost of the dwelling 
by $5,000 or more; and 
c. elected to repair or replace the damaged 
building; 
we will: 
d. increase the Coverage A limit of liability to 
equal the current replacement cost of the 
dwelling if the amount of loss to the dwell-
ing is more than the limit of liability shown 
in the Declarations; and 
e. increase by the same percentage applied to 
Coverage A, the limits of liability for Cov-
erages B, C and D. However, we will do this 
only if the Coverage A limit of liability is 
increased under paragraph d. above as a re-
sult of a Coverage A loss. 
2. If you comply with the provisions of para-
graph 1. above and there is a loss to the dwell-
ing insured under Coverage A, then paragraph 
b. of Section I Condition 3. Loss Settlement is 
deleted and replaced by the following: 
b. Buildings under Coverage A or Coverage B 
at replacement cost without deduction for 
depreciation. Replacement cost will include 
any increased cost due to the enforcement 
of any ordinance or law that regulates the 
construction, repair or demolition of the 
covered buildings. Loss settlements under 
this paragraph are subject to the following: 
(1) We will pay no more than the smallest 
of the following amounts for equivalent 
construction and use on the same prem-
ises: 
(a) the replacement cost of the build-
ing or any parts of it; 
(b) the amount actually and necessa-
rily spent to repair or replace the 
building or any parts of it; 
(c) the applicable limit of liability 
whether increased or not, ad-
justed in accordance with para-
graph l.d. or e. above. 
(2) When the cost to repair or replace the 
damaged building is more than $5,000, 
we will pay no more than the replace-
ment cost of the damage, less deduction 
for depreciation, until actual repair or 
replacement is completed. 
COVERAGE M—PERSONAL PROPERTY AT 
OTHER LOCATIONS 
The limit of liability for Coverage C—Personal 
Property usually located at an "insured's" resi-
dence, other than the "residence premises", is in-
creased. The revised limit is shown for Coverage 
M in the Declarations. 
COVERAGE O—EARTHQUAKE 
We insure for direct physical loss to property 
covered under Coverage A—Dwelling and Cover-
age B—Other Structures, Section I, caused by 
earthquake including land shock waves or trem-
ors before, during or after a volcanic eruption. 
1. One or more earthquake shocks that occur 
within a seventy-two hour period constitute a 
single earthquake. 
2. The following is the only deductible that ap-
plies to Coverage A and Coverage B to each 
loss caused by earthquake: 
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We will pay only that part of the loss which 
is more than a specified percentage of the 
total amount of insurance that applies This 
percentage is shown for Coverage 0 in the 
Declarations. This deductible will apply sep-
arately to loss under Coverage A—Dwelling 
and Coverage B—Other Structures. This de-
ductible amount will not be less than $250 
in any one loss. 
All exclusions under Section I of this policy apply 
to Coverage 0. However, the Section I—Earth 
Movement exclusion does not apply to loss 
caused by earthquake including land shock 
waves or tremors before, during or after a vol-
canic eruption. 
Special Exclusions 
1. We do not cover loss resulting directly or indi-
rectly from flood of any nature or tidal wave, 
whether caused by, resulting from, contrib-
uted to or aggravated by earthquake. 
2. We do not cover loss to exterior masonry ve-
neer unless the words INCLUDING EXTERIOR 
MASONRY VENEER are shown in the Declara-
tions. If exterior masonry veneer is not cov-
ered, the value of the extenor masonry veneer 
will be deducted before applying the deduct-
ible clause. For the purpose of this exclusion, 
stucco is not considered masonry veneer 
This coverage does not increase the limits of lia-
bility stated in this policy and does not include 
the cost of filling land. 
COVERAGE P—PERMITTED INCIDENTAL 
OCCUPANCIES (Not applicable to Home Day 
Care or similar operations.) 
We cover the "business" conducted by an "in-
sured" as described in Coverage P in the Declara-
tions subject to the following. However, we do 
not cover a "business" if it involves home day 
care or similar operations. 
Section I: Applies only when the described 
"business" is conducted on the "residence prem-
ises". 
1. Coverage B—Other Structures is extended to 
include structures used in connection with the 
described "business". 
2. Coverage C—Personal Property is extended to 
include furnishings, supplies and equipment 
used in connection with the described "busi-
ness". 
Item 8 under Special Limits of Liability does 
not apply to the described "business". 
Section II: Applies to the "residence premises" 
or, if applicable, to an "insured location" when 
shown in the Declarations as an ADDITIONAL 
RESIDENCE. 
Exclusions 
All exclusions under Section II of this policy ap-
ply to Coverage P in addition to the following: 
1 This insurance does not apply to "bodily in-
jury" to: 
a. any employee of an "insured" arising out 
of the "business" use described in Cover-
age P in the Declarations other than to a 
"residence employee" while engaged in the 
employee's employment by an "insured"; 
or 
b. any pupil arising out of corporal punish-
ment administered by or at the direction of 
the "insured". 
2. Item (1) under exclusion Lb. of Coverage E— 
Personal Liability and Coverage F—Medical 
Payments to Others is deleted and the follow-
ing substituted: 
(1) activities which are usual to non-"busi-
ness" pursuits or to the necessary or inci-
dental use of the premises to conduct the 
"business" pursuits as described in Cover-
age P in the Declarations; or 
COVERAGE Q—WATERCRAFT 
Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage 
F—Medical Payments to Others apply to "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" arising out of: 
1. the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or 
unloading of the watercraft described for Cov-
erage Q in the Declarations; 
2. the entrustment by an "insured" of the water-
craft described for Coverage Q in the Declara-
tions to any person; or 
3. statutorily imposed vicarious parental liabil-
ity for the actions of a child or minor using a 
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watercraft described for Coverage Q in the 
Declarations. 
All exclusions under Section II of this policy ap-
ply except to the watercraft described for Cover-
age Q in the Declarations. 
This insurance does not apply with respect to 
watercraft with inboard or inboard-outdrive mo-
tor power or sailing vessels: 
1. to "bodily injury" to any employee of an "in-
sured" arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment by the "insured" if the employee's 
principal duties are in connection with the 
maintenance or use of watercraft; or 
2. while the watercraft is used to carry persons 
for a charge or is rented to others. 
COVERAGE R—BUSINESS PURSUITS 
Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage 
F—Medical Payments to Others apply to the 
"business" pursuits of the "insured" as stated 
for Coverage R in the Declarations. 
All exclusions under Section II of this policy ap-
ply except to the "business" pursuits of the "in-
sured" as stated for Coverage R in the Declara-
tions. Additionally, this insurance does not apply: 
1. to "bodily injury" or "property damage" aris-
ing out of the "business" pursuits of the "in-
sured" in connection with a "business" owned 
or financially controlled by the "insured" or 
by a partnership of which the "insured" is a 
partner or member; 
2. to "bodily injury" or "property damage" aris-
ing out of the rendering of or failure to render 
professional services of any nature other than 
teaching, including but not limited to any: 
a. architectural, engineering or industrial de-
sign services; 
b. medical, surgical, dental or other services 
or treatment conducive to the health of per-
sons or animals; and 
c. beauty or barber services or treatment; 
3. to "bodily injury" to a fellow employee of the 
"insured" injured in the course of employ-
ment; or 
4. when the "insured" is a member of the faculty 
or teaching staff of any school or college to 
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"bodily injury" or "property damage" arising 
out of the maintenance, use, loading, unload-
ing or entrustment by the "insured" to any 
person, of; 
a. draft or saddle animals; 
b. vehicles for use therewith; 
c. aircraft; 
d. motor vehicles or all other motorized land 
conveyances; or 
e. watercraft; 
owned or operated, or hired by or for the "in-
sured" or employer or used by the "insured" 
for the purpose of instruction in the use 
thereof. 
OPTIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
COVERAGES 
This section of your policy contains supplemen-
tal coverage options which you may select. None 
apply, however, unless specifically selected by 
you. The supplemental coverages you select are 
listed as endorsement numbers in the Declara-
tions. 
PERSONAL ARTICLES 
SUPPLEMENT 
(7710) 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
For an additional premium, we cover the classes 
of property indicated on the Declarations page, 
subject to the Definitions, Section I Conditions 
and the Sections I and II Conditions of this policy 
and all provisions of this supplement. The most 
we will pay for loss to each class of property is 
the amount of insurance less any deductible 
shown for that class on the Declarations page. 
CLASSES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. Jewelry, as scheduled. 
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2. Jewelry, meaning articles of personal adorn-
ment owned by the "insured" composed at 
least partially of precious metal, whether or 
not set with gems or pearls, unscheduled. 
3. Furs and garments trimmed with fur or con-
sisting principally of fur, as scheduled. 
4. Furs and garments trimmed with fur or con-
sisting principally of fur, unscheduled. 
5. Cameras, projection machines, films, home 
video cameras and recorders, and related ar-
ticles of equipment, as scheduled. 
You agree not to use this equipment for pay 
unless the words INCLUDING PROFES-
SIONAL USE are shown in the Declarations. 
6. Musical Instruments and related articles of I 
equipment, as scheduled. 
You agree not to perform with these instru-
ments for pay unless the words INCLUDING 
PROFESSIONAL USE are shown in the Dec-
larations. 
7. Silverware, silver-plated ware, goldware, 
gold-plated ware, and pewter-ware; but ex-
cluding pens, pencils, flasks, smoking imple-
ments, or jewelry. 
8. Golfer's Equipment meaning golf clubs, golf 
clothing, and golf equipment. 
9. Fine Arts, as scheduled, at the location de-
scribed in the Declarations page. 
0. Postage Stamps owned by or in the custody 
or control of the "insured", including the 
following: 
a. Due, envelope, official, revenue, match, 
and medical stamps; 
b. Covers, locals, reprints, essays, proofs, 
and other philatelic property; or 
c. Books, pages, and mountings of items in 
a. and b. 
1- Coin Collections owned by or in the custody 
or control of the "insured" including the fol-
lowing: 
a. Rare or current coins; 
b. Medals, paper money, bank notes; 
c. Tokens of money and other numismatic 
property; or 
d. Coin albums, containers, frames, cards, 
and display cabinets in use with the col-
lection. 
12. Personal Computers. 
13. Sports Equipment, as scheduled. 
14. Miscellaneous Property, not otherwise 
classed as described elsewhere in this sup-
plement. 
NEWLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY 
We cover newly acquired items of a class of prop-
erty already insured for their actual cash value. 
However, for the class Fine Arts the most we will 
pay is 25% of the amount of insurance. For all 
other classes, the most we will pay is 25% of the 
amount of insurance for that class of property, or 
$25,000, whichever is less. For coverage to apply, 
the "insured" must report these new items to us 
within 30 days from the date acquired and pay 
the additional premium from that date. This 
paragraph does not apply to the class of property 
Personal Effects. 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
We insure the described property against nsks of 
direct physical loss subject to the General Exclu-
sions and other provisions of this supplement. 
LOSS DEDUCTIBLE 
No deductible shall apply to any class of prop-
erty unless specifically shown for that class in 
the Declarations with an amount. 
Each claim for loss shall be adjusted separately 
in accordance with the Loss Settlement condi-
tions of this supplement. If a deductible amount 
is shown in the Declarations for a class of prop-
erty, we will subtract that amount from each ad-
justed loss to that class. 
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GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 
Me do not cover: 
1. Loss caused by wear and tear, gradual dete-
rioration or inherent vice. 
2. Loss caused by insects or vermin. 
3. Loss caused by war, including the following 
and any consequence of any of the follow-
ing: 
a. Undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, 
rebellion, or revolution. 
b. Warlike act by a military force or military 
personnel. 
c. Destruction, seizure, or use for a military 
purpose. 
Discharge of a nuclear weapon shall be 
deemed a warlike act even if accidental. 
4. Loss caused by nuclear hazard, to the extent 
set forth in the Nuclear Hazard clause of 
Section I — Conditions. 
5. If Fine Arts are covered: 
a. Loss caused by any repairing, res-
toration, or retouching process. 
b. Loss to property on exhibition at fair 
grounds or premises of national or inter-
national expositions, unless the premises 
are covered by this policy. 
6. If Musical Instruments are covered and or-
gans not of a mobile nature are insured, we 
do not cover loss or damage to such organs 
caused by mechanical breakdown or failure, 
repairing, adjusting, servicing or mainte-
nance unless fire or explosion results; and 
then only for the loss or damage by such re-
sulting fire or explosion. 
7. If Postage Stamps or Coin Collections are 
covered: 
a. Fading, creasing, denting, scratching, 
tearing, or thinning. 
b. Transfer of colors, inherent defect, damp-
ness, extremes of temperature or depreci-
ation. 
c. Any damage from being handled or 
worked on. 
d. Disappearance ot individual stamps*, 
Coins, or other articles unless the item is: 
(1) Described and scheduled with a spe-
cific amount of insurance; or 
(2) Mounted in a volume and the page it 
is attached to is also lost. 
e. Loss to property in the custody of trans-
portation companies. 
f. Shipments by mail other than registered 
mail. 
g. Theft from any unattended automobile 
unless the property is being shipped as 
registered mail. 
h. Loss to property not part of a Stamp or 
Coin Collection. 
We cover 
TERRITORIAL LIMITS 
the property described worldwide. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
1. If Fine Arts are covered under this supple-
ment, you agree that such property will be 
handled by competent packers. 
2. Golfer's Equipment includes your clothing 
while contained in a locker when you are 
playing golf. We cover golf balls for loss only 
by: 
a. Fire; or 
b. Burglary, provided there are visible 
marks of forcible entry into the building, 
room, or locker. 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
1. LOSS CLAUSE 
The amount of insurance under this supple-
ment shall not be reduced except for a total 
loss of a scheduled article. We will refund 
the unearned premium applicable to such ar-
ticle after the loss. 
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2, .OSS SETTLEMENT 
Fine Arts — For a total loss to a sched-
uled item, we will pay the amount shown 
in the schedule for that item. That 
amount is agreed to be the value of the 
article. Partial losses will be adjusted ac-
cording to 2d. below. 
D. Postage Stamps or Coin Collections — 
The amount we will pay under these 
classes of property will be determined as 
follows: 
(1) In case of loss to any scheduled item, 
the amount to be paid will be deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph 
2d. below. 
(2) When Coins or Stamps are covered on 
an unscheduled basis, we will pay the 
cash market value at the time of loss, j 
but not more than $1,000 on any un- I 
scheduled Coin Collection, nor more 
than $250 for any one stamp, coin, or 
individual article or any one pair, 
strip, block, series sheet, cover, 
frame, or card. 
We will not pay a greater proportion 
of any loss on unscheduled property 
than the amount insured on un-
scheduled property bears to the cash 
market value of all such property at 
the time of loss, 
c. Jewelry — For a covered total loss to 
scheduled jeweiry, if the words AGREED 
VALUE JEWELRY COVERAGE APPLIES 
are shown in the Declarations, we will 
pay the amount shown in the schedule for 
each article. That amount is agreed to be 
the value of the article, 
d. Other Property — Unless otherwise 
stated in this supplement, the value of 
the property insured is not agreed upon 
but will be ascertained at the time of loss. 
We will not pay more than the least of the 
following amounts: 
(1) The actual cash value of the property 
at the time of loss. I 
(2) The amount for which the property 
could reasonably be expected to be 
repaired to its condition just before 
the loss. 
(3) The amount for which the article 
could reasonably be expected to be 
replaced with one substantially iden-
tical. 
(4) The applicable amount of insurance. 
When furs or jewelry are covered on an 
unscheduled basis, the amount to be paid 
is also subject to the limit per article, as 
shown in the Declarations page, for each 
class. 
e. Loss to a Pair, Set, or Parts 
(1) Fine Arts — In case of loss to part of 
a set, we agree to pay you the full 
amount of the set as shown in the 
schedule, if you agree to surrender 
the remaining articles of the set to us. 
If you do not agree we will settle ac-
cording to 2e.(3)A. below. 
(2) Jewelry — In case of loss to part of a 
set, we agree to pay you the value of 
the entire set in accordance with Gen-
eral Condition 2c, if you agree to sur-
render the remaining articles of the 
set to us. If this Policy has been ex-
tended to provide agreed value jew-
elry coverage, then we will pay the 
agreed value of the set. 
If you do not agree to surrender the 
remaining articles of the set to us, we 
will settle according to 2e.(3)A. be-
low. 
(3) Other Property 
A. Pair or Set 
In case of a loss to a pair or set, 
we may elect to: 
(a) Repair or replace any part to 
restore the pair or set to its 
value before the loss; or 
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(b) Pay the difference between ac-
tual cash value of the prop-
erty before and after the loss. 
B. Parts 
In case of a loss to any part of cov-
ered property, consisting of sev-
eral parts when complete, we will 
pay for the value of the part lost 
or damaged. 
PERSONAL LIABILITY 
UMBRELLA SUPPLEMENT 
(3100) 
PART I DEFINITIONS 
In this Policy "you" and "your" mean the 
NAMED INSURED shown in the Declarations, 
and the spouse if a resident of the same house-
hold. "We", "us" and "our" mean the member 
company of The Travelers providing this insur-
ance and shown as the INSURER in the Declara-
tions. In addition, certain other words and 
phrases, when printed in quotation marks, have 
specific meanings when used in this policy. These 
are defined as follows: 
A. "Auto" means: 
1. Any kind of private passenger motor ve-
hicle including, but not limited to, an au-
tomobile, motorcycle, moped, pickup, 
van, or self-propelled mobile home; or 
2. While towed by a vehicle described in 1. 
above, a trailer, farm tractor, farm 
wagon or farm implements. 
B. "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, sick-
ness, or disease which occurs during the 
term of this policy. It includes required 
care, loss of services, death and mental 
anguish that results. 
C. "Business" includes any full or part-time 
trade, profession, or occupation. 
D. "Family member" means a resident of 
your household who is: 
I. Your relative, including your ward or 
foster child; or 
2. Under the age of 21 and in your care or 
the care of any person named in 1. 
above. 
E. "Insured" means: 
1. You; but, with respect to your use of an 
"auto" you do not own which is fur-
nished or available for your regular use, 
only if you are insured for your use of 
that "auto" under one or more "primary 
insurance" policies for not less than the 
auto liability deductible amount in Part 
IV of this supplement; 
2. Any "family member" if such "family 
member" 
a. Is legally responsible for an "occur-
rence" covered under this supple-
ment; and 
b. Is also insured for such "occurrence" 
under one or more "primary insur-
ance" policies for not less than the ap-
plicable deductible amount shown in 
Part IV of this supplement. 
3. Any other persons or organizations in-
sured for the "occurrence" in your "pri-
mary insurance" policies, but only for 
their liability for the acts or omissions of 
an "insured" under Parts 1 or 2 of this 
definition. 
F. "Minimum retained limit" means the 
greater of: 
1. The total limits of any other insurance 
that applies to the "occurrence", includ-
ing insurance under other parts of this 
policy, which: 
a. Is available to an "insured"; or 
b. Would have been available except for 
the bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insurer providing "primary insur-
ance"; or 
2. The applicable deductible amount shown 
in Part IV of this supplement. 
G. "Occurrence" means an accident, including 
exposure to conditions which results in 
"bodily injury" or "property damage". All 
injury* loss, or damage from continuous or 
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repeated exposure to the same general con-
ditions will be considered due to one "oc-
currence". It also means offenses which re-
sult in "personal injury". 
For Loss Assessment coverage, "occur-
rence" also means: 
1. Direct loss to property owned by all 
members of the corporation or associa-
tion collectively but only if the loss is 
caused by a peril insured against under a 
"primary insurance" policy and the loss 
is covered by a property insurance pol-
icy issued to the corporation or associa-
tion. 
2. An act of a director, officer or trustee of a 
corporation or association of property 
owners, acting as a director, officer or 
trustee, which results in "bodily injury", 
"property damage" or "personal injury" 
for which the corporation or association 
becomes legally responsible, provided 
the director, officer or trustee: 
a. Is elected by the members of a corpo-
ration or association of property own-
ers; and 
b. Serves without deriving any income 
from the exercise of duties which are 
solely on behalf of a corporation or 
association of property owners. 
H. "Personal injury" means injury caused by 
any of the following offenses committed 
during the policy term: 
1. False arrest; 
2. False detention; 
3. False imprisonment; 
4. Malicious prosecution; 
5. Libel; 
6. Slander; 
7. Defamation; 
8. Violation of right of privacy; 
9. Wrongful entry; 
10. Wrongful eviction; or 
11. Other invasion of right to private occu-
pancy. 
I. "Primary i n s t a n c e " means any policy 
providing the "insured" with initial or pri-
mary liability insurance covering one or 
more of the types of liability listed in Part 
IV of this supplement. 
J. "Property damage" means physical injury 
to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible 
property which occurs during the policy 
term. 
K. "Recreational vehicle1' means a land mo-
tor vehicle designed for recreational use off 
public roads. It does not include "autos". 
L. "Residence premises" means: 
1. Any one to four-family dwelling that you 
live in and its grounds. This includes 
other structures on the grounds; or 
2. The part of any other building where 
you live. It does not include common 
ground areas. 
PART II INSURING AGREEMENT 
In return for payment of premiums when due, 
and subject to the Sections I and II Conditions of 
this policy and the terms of this supplement, we 
will pay damages for which the "insured" be-
comes legally responsible due to "bodily injury", 
"property damage", or "personal injury" caused 
by an "occurrence". 
This coverage applies only to damages in excess 
of the "minimum retained limit". 
PART III DEFENSE AND 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
A. Defense. 
1. We will defend an "insured" if sued as a 
result of an "occurrence" covered by this 
supplement even if the suit is groundless, 
false, or fraudulent. 
2. We have the nght to jom in the defense of 
any suit likely to involve us. 
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3. We will not be obligated <to defend any 
suit: 
a. If the "occurrence" is covered by any 
other insurance available to the "in-
sured"; 
b. If there is no applicable "primary in-
surance" in effect at the time of the "oc-
currence" and the amount of damages 
claimed or incurred is not more than 
the applicable deductible amount 
shown in Part IV of this supplement; or 
c. After our limit of liability has been ex-
hausted by the payment of judgments 
or settlements. 
4. We may investigate and settle any claim or 
suit as we see fit. 
B. Additional Coverages. 
1. Defense costs 
We will pay for the following in addition to 
our limit of liability: 
a. All costs and expenses we incur to de-
fend a claim or lawsuit against an "in-
sured". 
b. Premiums on bonds required in a suit 
we defend, but only for that portion of 
the bond not exceeding our limit of lia-
bility. We are not obligated to apply for 
or furnish these bonds. 
c. Interest which accrues after judgment 
in a lawsuit and before we pay, offer, or 
deposit in court that part of the judg-
ment which does not exceed our limit of 
liability. 
d. Reasonable expenses incurred by an 
"insured" at our request. This includes 
actual loss of wages up to $100 a day 
due to attendance at hearings or trials 
at our request. 
e. In some countries, we may be prevented 
from defending an "insured" because of 
laws or other reasons. In that event we 
will pay any expenses incurred with 
our written consent for the "insured's" 
defense. 
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2. Loss Assessment 
We will pay, in excess of the "minimum re-
tained limit", your share of any loss as-
sessment charged during the policy period 
against you by a corporation or associa-
tion of property owners. This only applies 
when the assessment is made as a result of 
an "occurrence" covered by this supple-
ment. 
This coverage applies only to loss assess-
ment charged against you as owner or ten-
ant of the "residence premises". 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
against you or a corporation or association 
of property owners by any government 
body. 
Payments made under this section are in-
cluded in the applicable limit of liability. 
PART IV DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNTS 
Deductible Amounts 
$500,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
50,000 Per Occurrence 
If the "insured" maintains "primary insurance" 
with "auto" liability limits of $500,000/$500,000 
"bodily injury" and $100,000 "property dam-
age", then the deductible amount applicable to 
"auto" liability shall be such limits. 
A deductible of $1,000 will apply to each "occur-
rence" which: 
1. is covered by this supplement; and 
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Types of Liability 
Auto 
Personal . . . 
Recreational 
Vehicle . . 
Watercraft . . 
Business 
Pursuits . . 
Business 
Property . . 
Employers 
Liability . . 
Loss Assessment 
2. arises out of a vehicle, property, or other ex-
posure insured by "primary insurance" 
with limits at least equal to the applicable 
deductible amount shown above; and 
3. is not covered under the provisions of the 
policies referred to in No. 2 above. 
This provision does not apply to Loss Assess-
ment. 
PART V EXCLUSIONS 
This insurance does not apply: 
1. To damages the "insured" or any company 
providing "primary insurance" may have 
to pay under any of the following laws: 
a. Worker's Compensation; 
b. Unemployment Compensation; 
c. Disability benefits; or 
d. Any other similar law. 
2. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or 
"personal injury" arising out of: 
a. The ownership, maintenance, use, load-
ing or unloading of an aircraft; 
b. The entrustment by an "insured" of an 
aircraft to any person; or 
c. Statutorily imposed vicarious parental 
liability for the actions of a child or mi-
nor using an aircraft. 
Aircraft means any contrivance used or 
designed for flight except model or 
hobby aircraft not used or designed to 
carry people or cargo. 
3. To "property damage" to: 
a. Property owned by an "insured". 
b. Watercraft under the care, custody, or 
control of an "insured". 
c. Property rented to, occupied or used by, 
or in the care of an "insured" to the ex-
tent the "insured" is under contract to 
provide insurance for such damage. 
However, this exclusion does not apply 
to liability imposed on the "insured" by 
common law or statute. 
4. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
expected or intended by an "insured". 
However, this exclusion does not apply to 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" re-
sulting from an "insured's" use of reason-
able force to protect persons or property. 
5. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or 
"personal injury" arising out of "business" 
property or "business" pursuits of an "in-
sured". However, this exclusion does not 
apply to: 
a. Any part of a one to four-family resi-
dential dwelling you rent or hold for 
rent other than the "residence prem-
ises"; 
b. Condominium units you rent or hold for 
rent, other than a "residence premises". 
c. Any "residence premises" or other one 
to four-family residence occupied in 
part as an office, school or studio. 
d. Any "residence premises": 
(1) Rented or held for rent in part, un-
less intended for use as a residence 
by more than two roomers or board-
ers per family; 
(2) Occasionally rented or held for rent 
for short periods of time for dwell-
ing purposes; 
(3) Rented or held for rental as a pri-
vate garage. 
e. Occasional or part-time jobs of "in-
sureds" who are students under 21 
years of age. 
f. Civic activities performed by an "in-
sured" without pay. 
g. Activities connected with the "in-
sured's" occupation if a Collector, Mes-
senger, Salesman or Teacher except: 
(1) We will not pay for "bodily injury" 
or "property damage" arising out of 
a business or school the "insured": 
(a) Financially controls; 
(b) Is a joint venture member of; or 
(c) Is a partner in. 
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(2) We will not pay for claims or dam-
ages arising out of the maintenance, 
use, loading or unloading, or en-
trustment by the "insured" to any 
person of: 
(a) Draft or saddle animals; 
(b) Vehicles for use therewith; 
(c) Aircraft; 
(d) Motor vehicles or all other mo-
torized land conveyances; or 
(e) Watercraft; 
owned or operated, or hired by or 
for the "insured" or employee or 
used by the "insured" for the pur-
pose of instruction in the use 
thereof. 
h. The providing of home day care service, 
but only when, 
(1) an "insured" provides such service 
for a relative of an "insured"; or 
(2) a mutual exchange of services ar-
rangement exists involving no mon-
etary compensation. 
i. The incidental use of your private pas-
senger "autos" by an "insured" or any 
partner, agent or employee of an "in-
sured" in the "business" of: 
(1) selling; (4) storing; or 
(2) repairing; (5) parking; 
(3) servicing; 
vehicles designed for use mainly on pub-
lic highways. 
However, we do not cover vehicles 
owned by an "insured" primarily for 
use in such "business". 
j . The use of private passenger "autos" by 
an "insured" for "business" purposes 
not described in 5.i. above. However, we 
do not cover the carrying of persons for 
a fee, other than in a car pool arrange-
ment. 
k. Incidental farming by any "insured" on 
the "residence premises". 
6. To the rendering of or failure to render any 
professional service. 
7. To "bodily injury", "property damage" 
and "personal injury" due to an 4tin-
sured's" act or omission as a member of 
the board of directors of any corporation, 
except non-profit corporations or organiza-
tions. 
8. To the extent that any other insurance is 
available to the "insured". 
9. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or 
"personal injury" for which the "insured" 
is also covered under a nuclear energy lia-
bility policy, even if the limits of liability 
for that policy have been exhausted 
10. To "personal injury" due to: 
a. Violation of a penal statute or ordinance 
by or with the knowledge of the "in-
sured"; 
b. Advertising, broadcasting, or telecast-
ing activities by the "insured", or 
c. Libel, slander, defamation, or violation 
of privacy: 
(1) If the same first injurious publica-
tion or utterance occurs prior to the 
effective date of this issuance; or 
(2) If the offense committed is about 
any organization or business, its 
products, or services, made with the 
knowledge of the falsity and by or 
at the direction of the "insured". 
11. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
due to the release or escape of: 
a. Waste materials; 
b. Irritants; 
c. Contaminants; or 
d. Pollutants. 
However, this exclusion does not apply if 
the release or escape is sudden and acci-
dental. 
12. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
caused directly or indirectly by war, in-
cluding undeclared war, civil war, insurrec-
tion, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a 
military force or military personnel, de-
struction or seizure or use for a military 
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purpose, and including any consequence of 
any of these. Discharge of a nuclear 
weapon shall be deemed a warlike act even 
if accidental. 
13. To "bodily injury" and "personal injury" 
to any "insured". 
14. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
arising out of the use of any "auto", "rec-
reational vehicle", or watercraft in racing 
events, including practicing for a race. 
This exclusion does not apply to sailboats. 
15. To "bodily injury" or "personal injury" 
arising out of the transmission of a commu-
nicable disease by an "insured". 
16. To amounts assessed against you by a cor-
poration or association of property owners 
except as provided under Additional Cov-
erages—Loss Assessment. 
PART VI CONDITIONS 
The following conditions apply in addition to the 
Sections I and II Conditions of this policy; 
A. "INSURED'S" DUTIES AFTER AN 
OCCURRENCE 
In the event of an "occurrence" which may 
involve this supplement, the "insured" must 
do the following: 
1. Give us a prompt, written notice. Include 
the names and addresses of all witnesses 
and injured persons. 
2. Promptly send us copies of all notices or 
legal papers related to the "occurrence". 
3. Cooperate with us in the investigation set-
tlement, or defense of any claim or suit. 
B. SUIT AGAINST US 
No legal action shall be brought against us: 
1. Unless the "insured" has fully complied 
with all the terms of this policy; and 
2. Until the amount of damages in excess of 
the "minimum retained limit" has been 
settled/This Amount may be determined 
either by judgment against the "insured" 
or by written agreement signed by the "in-
sured", the claimant, and us. 
No one has the right to involve us as a party 
to any legal action to determine the liability 
of an "insured". 
C. LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The most we will pay for all damages for any 
one "occurrence" is the limit shown on the 
Declarations page, regardless of the number 
of "insureds", claimants, or claims made. 
D. SEVERABILITY OF INSURANCE 
This coverage applies separately to each "in-
sured". This condition will not increase our 
limit of liability for any one "occurrence". 
E. SUBROGATION 
All of the "insured's" rights of recovery will 
become our rights to the extent of any pay-
ment we make under this supplement. The 
"insured" will do everything necessary to se-
cure such rights, and do nothing after loss to 
prejudice such rights. 
If we pay under this supplement and another 
person may be liable, we can exercise the 
rights of an "insured" against the person lia-
ble for the loss. Any recovery will be distrib-
uted in the following order: 
1. First, to any person who may have paid 
the liability exceeding the limit of our lia-
bility. 
2. Second, to us for the amount we have 
paid. 
3. Then, to any other party. 
The above amounts will be repaid less our 
proportionate share of the costs of recovery. 
This includes reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
F. APPEALS 
If the "insured" or any other insurer elects 
not to appeal a judgment which exceeds the 
"minimum retained limits" we may do so. We 
will pay the cost and interest incidental to ap-
peal. 
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G. BANKRUPTCY OF AN INSURED 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of an "insured" 
will neither: 
1 Relieve us of our obligations under this 
supplement, nor 
2 Operate to cause this supplement to be-
come primary in the event the "insured" is 
unable to satisfy the applicable deductible 
amount shown in Part IV of this supple-
ment either because of insufficient "pri-
mary insurance" or personal assets 
This policy is signed for the member company of 
The Travelers Insurance Companies which is the 
insurer under this policy 
^ Secretary ® ' President 
Includes copyrighted material of Insurance Ser-
vices Office, with its permission. Copyright, In-
surance Services Office, Inc., 1984, 1985 
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